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I.

I NTRODUCTION

Denying an individual the legal privileges and protections
accompanying a marriage license, based solely on sexual
orientation, is increasingly being recognized as an injustice. But
how does this moral indignation translate into Constitutional
jurisprudence? This was the crucial question before the Court in
Obergefell v. Hodges. 1 Interestingly enough, in recognizing an

1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
1021
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individual’s right to marry regardless of his or her sexual
orientation, the majority centered its decision not simply on the
more convincing and less controversial Equal Protection Clause;
rather, Justice Kennedy crafted the majority opinion largely
around substantive due process. This choice catapulted the Due
Process Clause to the focus of the dissenting opinions and, in so
doing, illuminated the modern substantive due process debate:
Does the Due Process Clause carefully protect only those rights
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and traditions” 2 or does it
also closely safeguard other, uniquely personal conduct—conduct
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty?”3
This Article uses the historical sweep of the Due Process
Clause to evaluate the merits of Obergefell’s majority and
dissenting opinions. Specifically, the Article explains why the Due
Process Clause’s prohibition on arbitrary punishments in
general—and legislative judgments in particular—invariably
mandates the judicial nullification of arbitrary and irrational
legislative acts. What exactly constitutes a “legislative judgment”
and how much deference courts should exercise in examining
legislative acts are the crucial and largely unanswered questions
lying at the heart of the Obergefell case (and in substantive due
process cases in general). Although the Obergefell Court’s
discussion focuses on a single case, it reflects a larger
jurisprudential inquiry some 800 years in the making: What are
the limitations on government power and what is the judiciary’s
role in enforcing those limitations?

II. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES
Same-sex couples in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and
Tennessee sued their relevant state agencies to challenge the
constitutionality of those states’ bans on same-sex marriage or
their refusals to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred
in other states. 4 The plaintiffs argued that the state laws violated
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Although the trial court in each of these
cases ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reversed those decisions and held that the states’
bans on same-sex marriage, along with their refusals to recognize
marriages performed in other states, did not violate the
2. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (internal
citations omitted).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan. J.,
concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo,
J.)).
4. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
5. Id. at 2623. One group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil
Rights Act.
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. 6 The Supreme Court of the United States granted the
plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari to resolve the following
questions: (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to
license a marriage between two people of the same sex?7 and (2)
Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a
marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally
licensed and performed in another state? 8

A. The Majority Opinion
The Court answered both of the questions on certiorari in the
affirmative. First, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a state to license same-sex marriages. 9 Because marriage
is already a well-established fundamental right, 10 the first issue
before the Court was a definitional one: Does the definition of the
“fundamental right”11 of marriage include same-sex couples? The
majority held that the definition must include same-sex couples
because their exclusion irrationally restricts those persons’
liberty12 and irrationally discriminates against that class of
persons. 13 Most importantly, the Court pointed out that in defining
6. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 402-03 (6th Cir. 2014).
7. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2607.
10. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (citing Skinner v. State of
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing that marriage is among the
“basic civil rights of man” and “fundamental to our very existence and
survival”)).
11. Under the Court’s substantive due process analysis, laws prohibiting or
otherwise limiting fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny. Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
12. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (“Under the Constitution, same -sex
couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples,
and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny
them this right.”).
13. The principles embedded in the Equal Protection Clause informed the
Court’s conclusion that the fundamental right of marriage must include samesex marriage because the exclusion of same -sex couples is irrational and
constitutionally intolerable. See id. at 2602-03 (“The Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set
forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by
equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning
and reach of the other.”); see also id. at 2604 (“[T]he marriage laws enforced by
the respondents are in essence unequal: same -sex couples are denied all the
benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a
fundamental right.”). This “synergy” between the Equal Protection Clause and
Due Process Clause was recognized by the Court in Skinner v. State of
Oklahoma and Loving v. Virginia. In Skinner, the Court relied upon the Due
Process Clause (or more specifically, the substantive due process-based
fundamental right of procreation) to justify the Court’s application of strict
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a “fundamental right” in the context of substantive due process,
the Court is informed by, but not necessarily confined to, those
rights “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and traditions.”14 As
the Court put it, although marriage is “fundamental as a matter of
history and tradition,”15 the content of that right “rise[s], too, from
a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives
define liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” 16 Lastly, the
Court held that individual states must honor other states’ legal
marriages because “there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to
recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State
on the grounds of its same-sex character.”17

B. Justice Roberts’s Dissent
While seemingly open to striking down laws that
discriminatorily deny specific marriage-based benefits to same-sex
spouses, 18 Justice Robert rejected the majority’s sweeping
substantive due process right to same-sex marriage. 19 In Justice
Robert’s opinion, 20 a fundamental rights-based substantive due
process claim “falls into the most sensitive category of
constitutional adjudication”21 and should therefore be effectively
limited to only those rights that are ‘“so rooted in the traditions

scrutiny in its Equal Protection analysis. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (“We
mention these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police power of the
States. We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny
of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest
unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups
or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and
equal laws.”). In Loving, the Court relied on the Equal Protection Clause to
establish the irrationality of denying the plaintiffs the substantive -dueprocess-based fundamental right of marriage. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“To
deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive
of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.”).
14. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618. See also id. at 2598 (2015) (“History and
tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer
boundaries.”).
15. Id. at 2602.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2608.
18. See id. at 2623 (Roberts, J. dissenting) (“The equal protection analysis
might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused
challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits.”).
19. Id. at 2616 (“I find the majority’s position indefensible as a matter of
constitutional law.”); see also id. at 2612 (“The majority’s decision is an act of
will, not legal judgment. The right it announces has no basis in the
Constitution or this Court’s precedent.”).
20. Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia joined Justice Roberts’s opinion. Id.
at 2610.
21. Id. at 2616.
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and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”’22
Stressing the need for ‘“judicial self-restraint”’ 23 given substantive
due process’s “few ‘guideposts for responsible decisionmaking,’”24
the Chief Justice reasoned that ‘“an approach grounded in history
imposes limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any
based on [an] abstract formula.”’ 25 Such limits, Justice Roberts
concluded, are “[t]he only way to ensure restraint in this delicate
enterprise”26 lest judges “elevate their own policy judgments to the
status of constitutionally protected ‘liberty’”27 and “convert[] [their]
[own] personal preferences into constitutional mandates.” 28
Regardless of the wisdom of the policy, because same-sex marriage
is not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and traditions,” 29
Justice Roberts asserted that the states have a legitimate interest
in preserving “traditional marriage.”30 Therefore, the government’s
denial of same-sex marriage cannot be remedied through
substantive due process.

C. Justice Scalia’s Dissent
Justice Scalia wrote separately31 to criticize what he believed
to be the Court’s usurpation of the democratic process. 32 The
majority’s “constitutional revision,”33 Scalia demurred, “robs the
People of the most important liberty they asserted in the
Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776:
the freedom to govern themselves.”34 Relying on the “plain
meaning”35 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it was ratified in
22. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
23. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
24. Id.
25. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 504, n. 12 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
26. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2618.
29. Id. at 2640 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21
(1997)).
30. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612-13 (“For all those millennia, across all
those civilizations, ‘marriage’ referred to . . . the union of a man and a woman .
. . ensuring that children are conceived by a mother and father committed to
raising them in the stable conditions of a lifelong relationship.”).
31. Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion. Id. at 2626.
32. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting). Scalia in fact characterizes the Court’s
holding as a “threat to American democracy.” Id.
33. Id. at 2627.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 2628 (“When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in
1868, every State limited marriage to one man and one woman, and no one
doubted the constitutionality of doing so. That resolves these cases.”); see also
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 1-176 (1997).
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1868, Scalia concluded that it is “unquestionable that the People
who ratified that provision did not understand it to prohibit a
practice [denying same-sex couples the right to marry] that
remained both universal and uncontroversial in the years after
ratification.”36 The Justice then chastised the Court for dismissing
what “the People ratified”37 by reinterpreting that Fourteenth
Amendment to protect “those rights that the Judiciary, in its
‘reasoned judgment,’ thinks the Fourteenth Amendment ought to
protect.”38 The Court’s ruling, in Scalia’s opinion, was nothing
short of a “naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, superlegislative—power.”39 Ever-forthright, Justice Scalia denounced
the Court’s “hubris”40 in declaring unconstitutional “what was,
until 15 years ago, the unanimous judgment of all generations and
all societies.”41 Lastly, the originalist Justice rejected the Court’s
assertion that a constitutionally-protected right can ‘“rise . . . from
a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives
define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.”’ 42

D. Justice Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas took issue not only with the Court’s
particular application of the Due Process Clause, but also with the
legal recognition of substantive due process in general. 43 In
addition to dismissing substantive due process as a “dangerous
fiction,”44 Justice Thomas questioned the majority’s reliance on the
concept of “liberty” to justify the constitutional protection of a
government-granted “entitlement.”45 Lastly, the Justice pointed
out that the majority’s opinion “threatens the religious liberty” 46 of
individuals wishing to express and exercise their serious and goodfaith religious objections to same-sex marriage. 47

36. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2629. Scalia goes on to say that “[a] system of government that
makes the People subordinate to a committee of nine unelected lawyers does
not deserve to be called a democracy.” Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2630.
42. Id. (quoting id. at 2602 (majority opinion)).
43. Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia joined Justice
Thomas’s opinion. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2638.
47. Id. at 2638-39.
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E. Justice Alito’s Dissent
In the final dissent, Justice Alito stressed the inherent danger
in allowing “five unelected Justices [to] impos[e] their personal
vision of liberty upon the American people.” 48 He argued that
“[t]he Constitution says nothing about a right to same-sex
marriage,”49 and sided with Court precedent that arguably limits
substantive due process protection only to those rights “‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” 50 Pointing out that
no state before 2003 recognized same-sex marriage, 51 Justice Alito
argued that the “deeply-rooted” right of marriage is “inextricably
linked to the one thing that only an opposite-sex couple can do:
procreate.”52 Justice Alito, therefore, concluded that same-sex
marriage is not a right “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
traditions” and, thus, cannot be among those fundamental rights
protected by the “liberty” of the Due Process Clause. 53 He then
criticized the majority for “claim[ing] the authority to confer
constitutional protection upon a right simply because they believe
that it is fundamental.”54 “If a bare majority of Justices can invent
a new right and impose that right on the rest of the country,”55
Justice Alito pointed out, “the only real limit on what future
majorities will be able to do is their own sense of what those with
political power and cultural influence are willing to tolerate.” 56
Going further, Alito suggested that the majority’s decision, which
eschews “the virtues of judicial self-restraint and humility”57 in
order to “achieve what is viewed as a noble end by any practicable
means . . . evidences the deep and perhaps irremediable corruption
of our legal culture’s conception of constitutional interpretation.” 58
What is the Court’s role in defining what rights are
“fundamental” (and therefore uniquely protected by the
Constitution) is a question that pervades the majority and
dissenting opinions. Should five unelected and unrepresentative
Justices have the power to veto democratic majorities? Does the
Due Process Clause have a substantive component? If so, should
judges be able to roam free in defining what rights are
“fundamental” and worthy of the Court’s heightened (and often
times fatal) scrutiny? Only a historically-rich understanding of the
48. Id. at 2640 (Alito, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
joined Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)).
51. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2640.
52. Id. at 2641.
53. Id. at 2641-42.
54. Id. at 2641.
55. Id. at 2643.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Due Process Clause and its jurisprudential application provides
the necessary insight into these momentous yet exceedingly
enigmatic questions.

III. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE
The Due Process Clause guarantees freedom from arbitrary
punishment. 59 Absent emergency circumstances, punishment is
“arbitrary” if it does not occur via a fundamentally fair judicial
adjudication. 60 As explained below, a “fundamentally fair judicial
adjudication” necessarily excludes unfair judicial adjudications
(precluded by procedural due process), legislative judgments
(precluded by substantive due process), and unreasonable
executive invasions (precluded by search and arrest warrant
requirements). 61 These requirements originate from Magna
Carta’s “law of the land” provision. 62 Its history, therefore,
provides the keystone to unlocking the meaning of the modern
constitutional clause.
59. See Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819) (“As
to the words from Magna Charta . . . they were intended to secure the
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,
unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive
justice”).
60. See Alexander Hamilton, Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections,
New York Assembly (Feb. 6 1787), reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS O F ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 34, 35 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962) (explaining that due process
requires punishment to be imposed via the “process and proceedings of the
courts of justice.”).
61. Criminal search and arrest requirements were originally integral parts
of the Fifth Amendment’s “due process of law” until the courts relocated
criminal search and arrest rights to the Fourth Amendment in the early
twentieth century. See In re Dorsey, 7 Port. (Ala.) 293, 404-05 (1838)
(emphasis added) (interpreting “due course of law” to mean “those forms of
arrest, trial and punishment, guarantied by the constitution, or provided by
the common law . . .”); Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266, 294 (1878) (Harlan, J.)
(emphasis added) (“The arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff . . . were
therefore in plain violation of the fifth constitutional amendment, which
declares that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of
law. No mere order or proclamation of the President for the arrest and
imprisonment of a person not in the military service, in a state removed from
the scene of actual hostilities, where the courts are open and in the
unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction, can constitute due process of law,
nor can it be made such by any act of Congress”); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 170 (1925) (McReynolds, J. dissenting) (emphasis added) (“The
arrest of plaintiffs in error was unauthorized, illegal and violated the
guarantee of due process given by the Fifth Amendment”).
62. See Appeal of Ervine, 16 Pa. 256, 263 (1851) (“And Lord Coke says that
the words ‘per legem terræ,’ mean, by due process of law, and being brought
into court to answer according to law”); Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dunmeyer, 19
Kan. 539, 542 (1878) (“The words, ‘by due course of law,’ are synonymous with
‘due process of law’ or ‘law of the land’ . . . .”).
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A. England’s “Law of The Land” Requirement
Originally, Magna Carta’s “by . . . the law of the land”
requirement meant “by the ancient rules and customs of AngloSaxon law,” as opposed to Norman law, which rested heavily on
the King’s prerogative. 63 This requirement was “procedural,” in
that punishment had to be imposed via specific Anglo-Sax laws, as
well as “substantive,” in that Norman-based laws and customs
were thereafter rendered not the “Law of the Land.”64
Following the rise of Parliament, 65 “law” required the assent
of both the House of Lords and the House of Commons. 66 This
substantive, separation-of-powers limitation meant that not every
63. Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1878) (“It is easy to
see that when the great barons of England wrung from King John, at the point
of the sword, the concession that neither their lives nor their property should
be disposed of by the crown, except as provided by the law of the land, they
meant by ‘law of the land’ the ancient and customary laws of the English
people . . .”); see also Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 432 (1856) (“The first
of these clauses, which had its origin in Magna Carta, brief as it is, embodies
the most essential guarantees against the exercise of arbitrary power which
that instrument contained. Its meaning, as there used, is plain, when we
consider that it was the result of a struggle which had lasted for more than a
century between the English people and the Norman kings, who had
supplanted the laws and customs of the Anglo Saxons, and established in their
place the prerogatives of royalty.”); see also J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 83 (2d ed. 2002).
64. See Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the
Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 HARV . J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 289 (2012)
(“Originating at a time before the clear separation of powers, the law of the
land provision allows the king to deprive people of rights only under certain
circumstances, and thus appears procedural: it guarantees only that the king
must follow certain procedures before depriving people of their freedom or
property. Yet the presence of those circumstances is constitutive of the
lawfulness of the king’s act, which means that those circumstances are also
substantive: It is the presence of those circumstances, not the king’s royal
authority--the what, not the how--that gives the king’s acts their lawful
character. In other words, the lawfulness guarantee presupposes that there
can be a difference between the ruler’s act and truly lawful acts”).
65. The Magna Carta led to the formation of a committee of 24 barons to
guarantee the King’s compliance with the charter. J.R. MADDICOTT, THE
O RIGINS OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 924-1327 237 (Oxford 2010). This
authority, later mixed with the tradition of “peerage” to differentiate between
commoners and the “Great Council,” and preceded the formation of the
modern-day Parliament, consisting of the House of Commons and the House of
Lords. Id. at 351-52.
66. Although “law” first required only the assent of the House of Lords, by
1414, the assent of the House of Commons grew to also be required. See
BAKER, supra note 63, at 178 n. 39 (“It was established in the principle that
amendments contrary to the terms of Commons’ bills had to be resubmitted to
the Commons.” (citing Rot. Parl., vol. IV, p. 22, no. 10 (1414)); see also id. at
178 (citations omitted) (“The parliamentary form of modern legislation is
rarely encountered before the end of the thirteenth century, and the consent of
the House of Commons was probably not regarded as indispensable until after
1400.”).
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political act in the form of a law was in fact law and,
correspondingly, part of the law of the land. So if the King, without
the assent of Parliament, decreed that all of his subjects had to
surrender an acre of land, such a decree would not have the
standing or power of “law.” Consequently, that decree would not be
part of the “law of the land” by which men could be deprived of
their property. The syllogism is fairly straightforward:
Major Premise: Magna Carta (as assented to by successive
English kings) provides that persons (freemen) can only be
deprived of their rights by the law of the land.
Minor Premise: Executive acts that deprive persons (freemen)
of their rights without the assent of Parliament are not “law.”
Conclusion: Persons (freeman) cannot be deprived of their
rights by executive acts lacking the assent of Parliament.
Accordingly, the Magna Carta was thereafter understood as
precluding arbitrary executive punishment. All punishment had to
be based on the law of the land, that is, the duly passed statutes,
common law, and customs of England. 67 This was both a
“procedural” and “substantive” requirement. 68

67. See BAKER, supra note 63, at 83 (citations omitted) (“It came to be
thought an Englishman’s birthright to be subject to [the common law] system
rather than to any other, and a steady stream of medieval statutes from
Magna Carta onwards guaranteed that no free man should be deprived of life,
liberty, or property save by ‘due process of law. These statutes were intended
as legal restraints on the power of the Crown . . .’”).
68. The key to understanding both the “procedural” and “substantive”
import of the “law of the land” provision to the Magna Carta is understanding
that it precludes arbitrary punishment. Id. Such a preclusion is both
prescriptive, in that it establishes specific modes of procedure and punishment
by which individuals can be deprived of their life, liberty, and property, and
prohibitive, in that it precludes forms of legislative and executive judgments).
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The “Law of the Land” and Judicial Process

Centuries later, and long after the Due Process statutes 69
were firmly implanted into the “law of the land,” it was established
and understood that all deprivations of rights had to be based on
the “Law of the Land” (that is, all punishments had to originate
from established statutes, common law, or custom 70) and according
to the “Law of the Land” (that is, according to the arrest,
detainment, accusation, and trial procedure firmly established in
the common law—as revised and reinforced by Parliament71). It
was this expanded understanding of the Magna Carta provision
that prompted the Petition of Right, an act of Parliament
statutorily recognizing “common law liberties.” 72 And it was this
judicial prerequisite of the “law of the land” clause that Lord Coke
thereafter memorialized the “Law of the Land” clause in his
immortal Institutes On The Laws Of England.73 The “Law,”
69. These duly-passed Parliamentary statutes during the reign of King
Edward III, which became so entrenched into the common law and customs of
England so as to become practically immune from conflicting legislation,
include: 5 Edw. 3, c. 9 (1331) (Eng.) (“[T]hat no man is to be attached by any
accusation, nor forejudged of life or limb, nor his lands, tenements, goods or
chattels seized into the King’s hands, against the form of the Great Charter
and the Law of the Land.”); 25 Edw. 3, c. 4 (1351) (Eng.) (“that none shall be
imprisoned nor put out of his Freehold, nor of his Franchises nor free Custom,
unless it be by the Law of the Land . . . .”); 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354) (Eng.) (“That
no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or
Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death,
without being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law.”) ; 36
Edw. 3, c. 9 (1362) (Eng.) (“[I]f any man feels himself grieved contrary to any
of the articles above written or any others contained in divers statutes, if he
will come into the chancery (or someone o n his behalf) and make his
complaint, he shall now have a remedy there by force of the said articles and
statutes
without
suing
anywhere
else
to
have
redress.”);
37
Edw. 3, c. 18 (1363) (Eng.) (“Though it be contained in the Great Charter that
no man be taken or imprisoned, or put out of his freehold without process of
law.”); 42 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1368) (Eng.) (“[T]hat no Man be put to answer without
Presentment before Justices, or Matter of Record, or by due Process and Writ
original, according to the old Law of the Land.”).
70. See Sandefur, supra note 64, at 289.
71. See statutes cited supra note 69.
72. Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense Of Substantive Due
Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, And The Fifth
Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 606 (2009) (“In Coke’s view, Magna Carta did
not merely confirm and restore the common law, but also declared the bedrock
constitutional principle that the common law bound and limited both the
crown and Parliament—a view that Coke emphatically and publicly
reaffirmed in the debates surrounding the drafting and execution of the
Petition of Right, Parliament’s declaration of fundamental common law
liberties enacted as a statutory bill under Coke’s influence in 1628”).
73. EDWARD COKE , THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 50 (photo. reprint 2002) (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1642);
see also In re John & Cherry Sts., 1838 N.Y. LEXIS 177, at *30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1838) (“[The due process clause] is an enlargement and extension of the words
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henceforth, did not include arbitrary executive action in any form.
Deprivations of rights at all stages had to be based on, and
according to, the statutes, common law, and customs of England. 74
Most notably, this was a procedural requirement in that the
executive had to arrest, detain, accuse, try and punish freemen
according to the statues and common law of England. However, it
was also a substantive limitation, in that any arrest, detainment,
accusation, trial, or punishment procedure unilaterally created by
the king was not “law” and, therefore, was not part of the law of
the land.
2.

The “Law of the Land” and Legislative Limitations

The next step in the “law of the land” evolution occurred over
the five year period between 1768 and 1773, starting with the
controversy over the expulsion of Member of Parliament John
Wilkes. 75 His supporters (and even some of his opponents such as
Wilkes’s prosecutor George Grenville76) argued that the House of
Commons had to follow established procedural rules when
expelling a member (i.e. depriving him of his certain vested
privileges). 77 They asserted that the House of Commons could not
in Magna Charta, ch. 29: “No freeman shall be disseised of his freehold, etc.,
but by the law of the land”). Interestingly, in his Institutes, Coke suggests at
least some “substantive” content in the “law of the land” provision by declaring
that monopolies were against Chapter 29 of Magna Carta. See Gedicks, supra
note 55, at 607.
74. See New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508,
522 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Nathan S. Chapman and Michael W. McConnell,
Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1782 (2012) (“The
first, central, and largely uncontroversial meaning of ‘due process of law,’ the
meaning established in Magna Charta and applied vigorously by Coke against
the first two Stuart Kings, was that the executive may not . . . restrain the
liberty of a person within the realm without legal authority arising either from
established common law or from statute.”). Compare “Quod principi placuit
legis habet vigorem,” John Kilcullen, Notes on Medieval Philosophy, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
(2010),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medievalpolitical/notes.html (“What pleases the ruler has the force of law, since by lex
regia, which was made concerning the emperor’s rule, the people conferred on
him all of its power to rule.”), and “Rex est lex loquens”, Lloyd Duhaime,
Edward Coke 1552-1634, DUHAIME ’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (Aug. 29, 2014),
www.duhaime.org/LawMuseum/LawArticle-613/Edward-Coke-1552-1634.aspx
(“[T]he king is the law speaking”), with “Quod Rex non debet esse sub
homine, sed sub Deo et lege,” Id. (“The king shall be under no other man’s
authority but that of God and the law”).
75. John Wilkes was a Member of Parliament imprisoned for publishing
material considered seditious libel. Proceedings in the Commons on the
Expulsion of Mr. Wilkes (Nov. 14, 1768), in 16 COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY
HISTORY O F ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803 534-35
(1813).
76. Chapman and McConnell, supra note 74, at 1695.
77. Id. at 561. See also Young v. State Bank, 4 Ind. 301, 303-04 (1853)
(“And, it is a power that should not be possessed by the legislature, in its

2016]

Implicit In The Concept Of Ordered Liberty

1033

simply make up procedure ipse dixit: such arbitrary action was not
“law” and, as consequence, was not part of the law of the land by
which a person could be deprived of his liberties under Magna
Carta. 78 Therefore, when acting in its judicial capacity, it was
contended that Parliament had to follow the applicable and
established common law procedures. 79 This was both a
“procedural” and “substantive” argument. In one respect, Grenville
and others were arguing that Wilkes could only be expelled
according to specific and established procedural safeguards. Yet, in
another respect, they were declaring that the expulsion of Wilkes
was an adjudication and, therefore, to expel Wilkes, the House of
Commons had to act in its judicial capacity, not its legislative
capacity80—a
clear
legislative-limiting,
separation-of-powers
argument.
Five years later, in response to an impending crisis involving
the East Indian Company, Parliament passed the Regulating Act
of 1773, a bill that rewrote the East Indian Company’s charter and
granted to the Crown control over the company affairs. 81 In
opposition to this perceived legislative usurpation, the Company
and its supporters in Parliament argued that the bill deprived the
Company of its established charter rights by an arbitrary
legislative act and not by the “Law of the Land” (i.e. an
adjudication based on the violation of a general and prospective

legislative capacity; because, in that capacity, it would not be governed by
legal rules. In governments where the constitution converts the legislature, on
some occasions and for some purposes, into a court, while that body is thus
acting, it is governed by the same rules, and restrained in its action by the
same authorities, as are courts of law. Not so where it acts simply in its
legislative capacity; and to permit it to dispose of judicial questions in that
capacity, would be in the highest degree dangerous to the rights of the
individual members of the community.”).
78. Proceedings in the Commons on the Expulsion of Mr. Wilkes, supra
note 75, at 565-66.
79. Proceedings in the Commons on the Expulsion of Mr. Wilkes, supra
note 75, at 561 (“We are now acting in our judicial capacity, and are therefore
to found the judgment which we are to give, not upon our wishes and
inclinations; not upon our private belief or arbitrary opinions, but upon
specific facts alleged and proved according to the established rules and course
of our proceedings. When we act as judges, we are not to assume the
characters of legislators . . .”) ; Chapman and McConnell, supra note 74, at
1696 (quoting Proceedings in the Commons on the Expulsion of Mr. Wilkes,
supra note 75, at 590) (“[T]he House when acting as a court of judicature was
bound by the law of the land as embodied by ‘like restraints adjudged in other
cases by all the courts of law; and confirmed by usage’”)).
80. Id. at 1696 (quoting Proceedings in the Commons on the Expulsion of
Mr. Wilkes, supra note 75, at 589-90) (“When houses of Parliament act as
‘courts of judicature,’ they ‘only have the power of declaring’ existing
‘restraints,’ and ‘in the use of that [judicial] power are bound by the law as it
stands at the time of making that declaration’”).
81. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 74, at 1697 (citing Tea Act, 1773,
13 Geo. 3, c. 44; East India Company Act, 1773, 13 Geo. 3, c. 63-64).
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rule of conduct). 82 In addition to its specific and concurrent nature,
the Act took vested rights from the Company, even though the
Company did not violate any of the terms of its charter. 83 Indeed,
as early as 1773, a “legal cause of forfeiture” 84 was considered a
fundamental part of the form of “law” by which an individual (or
entity) could be deprived of his (or its) rights. These legislativelimiting arguments in both the Wilkes case and the East Indian
Company case directly inspired colonial rejection of legislative
authority and deeply influenced colonial understanding of the
substantive component of the “law of the land.” 85

B. The Colonies and Due Process of Law
During the period leading up to the Declaration of
Independence
and
the
Revolutionary
War,
Parliament
systematically stripped the colonists of those ancient procedural
guarantees integral to England’s “common right and reason” 86
82. 4 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 31 (1993) (“The constitutional theory
was that the government, by granting a charter, vested in a company, colony,
or individuals certain inviolable privileges and securities of property that, if
not immutable, were answerable only at common law, not to legislative whim
and caprice”).
83. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 74, at 1698 (“The proper way to
amend the charter, opponents argued, was either to obtain the company’s
consent or to prevail in a common law action for breach of charter privileges.”).
84. See Debate in the Lords on the Bill to Restrain the East India
Company from Appointing Supervisors in India (Dec. 23, 1772), reprinted in
17 COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803 (1813) (recording a group of members of the House
of Lords criticizing the Bill because it “[took] away from a great body
corporate, and from several free subjects of this realm, the exercise of a legal
franchise, without any legal cause of forfeiture assigned”); see also id. at 651
(pointing out that the bill “did not state any delinquency in the Company”).
85. Indeed, the First Continental Congress made a similar “substantive”
due
process argument when Parliament unilaterally altered the
Massachusetts Charter in the Massachusetts Act. See Address to the People of
Great Britain (Oct. 21, 1774), in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS ,
1774-1789, at 87 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904) (emphasis added)
(“Without incurring or being charged with a forfeiture of their rights, without
being heard, without being tried, without law, and without justice, by an Act
of Parliament, their charter is destroyed, their liberties violated, their
constitution and form of government changed”).
86. See Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8 Co. Rep. 114a, 118a (C.P. 1610) (“[I]t
appeareth in our Books, that in many Cases, the Common Law doth controll
Acts of Parliament, and sometimes shall adjudge them to be void: for when an
Act of Parliament is against Common right and reason, or repugnant, or
impossible to be performed, the Common Law will controll it, and adjudge
such Act to be void”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Leading up to the
revolutionary war, colonists expanded the Cokean “common right and reason”
to encapsulate rights—both substantive and procedural—that they deemed
immune from legislative abrogation. James Otis, for example, argued that a
statute authorizing the notorious Writs of Assistance was “against common
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and, from time immemorial, 87 inherent in the “law of the land.”88
Indeed,
Parliament
abrogated
deep-rooted
common
law
immunities at both the pre-trial and trial stages of civil and
criminal prosecutions. In regard to pre-trial legal procedure, 89
Parliament authorized Writs of Assistance, 90 stationed standing
armies amongst the colonists, 91 uprooted protections against selfincrimination, 92 eviscerated the right to grand juries proceedings, 93
and limited access to the writ of habeas corpus. 94 In regard to trial

right and reason” and thus “void.” See Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the
Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law Criminal Arrest and Search
Rules in “Due Process of Law”-“Fourth Amendment Reasonableness” Is Only A
Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV . 51, 96 (2010). In
1765, John Adams argued that the Stamp Act was unconstitutional because it
was “against reason.” Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
87. Coke probably exaggerated the “ancient” status of many common law
rights. See Gedicks, supra note 72, at 598. Notwithstanding, the colonists were
more than eager to adopt Coke’s Parliamentary-limiting ideology.
88. The founding charters of the colonies guaranteed the protection of
Magna Carta and the common law. See R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial
Constitutional History of the Privilege Against. Self-Incrimination in America,
21 VA. L. REV . 763, 766 (1935) (citation omitted) (“In all of the early American
colonies, according to the royal instructions and granted charters, justice was
to be administered as closely as possible ‘to the common law of England and
the Equity thereof,’ and the colonists were to enjoy the privileges of
Englishmen ‘to all intents and purposes as if they had been abiding within . . .
[the] realm of England’”).
89. “Pre-trial legal procedure” in this context refers to all laws and
government acts pertaining to the search, arrest, detention, and accusation of
persons. This distinction is embodied in the first eight Amendments to the
Constitution, wherein search, arrest, detention, and accusation procedure is
addressed in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and trial and punishment
procedure is addressed in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eight Amendments. U.S.
CONST. amends. I-VIII.
90. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and
the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 980 (2011) (“[T]he period of 1761 to
1791 was characterized by aggressive British search and seizure practices and
was the era when the principles that found their way into the Fourth
Amendment crystallized”); see Tracey Maclin & Julia Mirabella, Framing the
Fourth, 109 MICH. L. REV . 1049, 1054 (2011) (“Hostility against writs of
assistance and general searches spread to other colonies with the enforcement
of the Townshend Revenue Act of 1767”).
91. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“He has kept
among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our
legislatures”).
92. Pittman, supra note 88, at 783-784 (tracing colonial apprehension for
compelled self-incrimination to “the prerogative courts of G overnor and
Council, which . . . were very inquisitional and ofttimes overbearing.”).
93. See infra, notes 76, 77. By transporting trials overseas and to
admiralty courts, the Crown side-stepped the common law Grand Jury
requirement.
94. See Max Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of Societal Change, 44
O HIO ST. L.J. 337, 338 (1983) (“The English Parliament had frequently
suspended the writ during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, thereby
permitting confinement without indictment, bail, or other judicial process”).
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procedure, Parliament stripped the colonist of a trial by jury, 95 a
jury of one’s own vicinage, 96 and, for all practical purposes, a
defendant’s right to call witnesses in his favor, 97 to present
evidence for his defense, 98 and to have assistance of counsel. 99
In opposition to these legislative usurpations, the colonists
advanced two basic arguments. First, colonists argued that such
Acts of Parliament were void as “against common right and
reason.”100 Second, the colonists argued that such Acts were
arbitrarily applied to the colonies and not the rest of England, and
thus they could not properly be considered the “law of the land.”101
The first argument was a procedural one: it stressed that some
common law procedural rights were so ancient, so embedded, and
so fundamental, that even Parliament could not lawfully abrogate
them. 102 The second argument was a substantive one: it recognized
95. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“For depriving us
in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury”). The Stamp Act authorized
trial by vice-admiralty courts, which operated under admiralty law, not
common law, procedures. Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial
Vice-Admiralty Courts (Part II), 27 J. MAR. L. & COM . 323, 335 (1996).
96. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“For transporting
us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses”). The Dockyar ds Act
deprived colonists of the right to trial by local jurors by removing prosecutions
for certain crimes to England. See Statement of Violations of Rights (Oct. 14,
1774), supra note 85, at 63-73 (“Resolved, N.C.D. That the following acts of
parliament are infringements and violations of the rights of the colonists; and
that the repeal of them is essentially necessary, in order to restore harmony
between Great Britain and the American colonies, viz . . . Also 12 Geo. III. ch.
24, intituled, ‘An act for the better securing his majesty’s dockyards,
magazines, ships, ammunition, and stores,’ which declares a new offence in
America, and deprives the American subject of a constitutional trial by jury of
the vicinage, by authorizing the trial of any person, charged with the
committing any offence described in the said act, out of the realm, to be
indicted and tried for the same in any shire or county within the realm.”).
97. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW O F THE RIGHTS O F BRITISH
AMERICA 15 (1774) (“And the wretched criminal, if he happen to have offended
on the American side, stripped of his privilege of trial by peers of his vicinage,
removed from the place where alone full evidence could be obtained, without
money, without counsel, without friends, without exculpatory proof, is tried
before judged predetermined to condemn.”).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Davies, supra note 86, at 96 (citations omitted).
101. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 97, at 5 (condemning the “many
unwarrantable encroachments and usurpations, attempted to be made by the
legislature of one part of the empire, upon those rights which God and the
laws have given equally and independently to all”).
102. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union
175 (1868) (“The maxims of Magna Charta and the common law are the
interpreters of constitutional grants of power, and those acts which by those
maxims the several departments of government are fo rbidden to do cannot be
considered within any grant or apportionment of power which the people in
general terms have made to those departments. The Parliament of Great
Britain, indeed, as possessing the sovereignty of the country, has the power to
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that, according to the fundamental form of law, legislative acts
had to be generally applicable to all English subjects—they could
not simply apply to colonists.
After the colonies declared independence in 1776, most of the
early states in writing (and all of them in practice) adopted the
immortal “law of the land” guarantee. 103 While the provision’s
restraint on executive power was well-established and universally
accepted among the several states in the pre-Constitutional era, 104
the provision’s restraint on legislative power was still in its
infancy and existed only by implication. 105 Since the phrase “law of

disregard fundamental principles, and pass arbitrary and unjust enactments;
but it cannot do this rightfully . . .”). The early state constitutions, although in
a largely unorganized and haphazard way, encapsulated many of these
fundamental common law rights. See Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 404
(1814) (“Many of the articles in that declaration of rights were adopted from
the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of rights passed in the reign
of William and Mary.”).
103. See Duane L. Ostler, Bills of Attainder and the Formation of the
American Takings Clause at the Founding of the Republic, 32 CAMPBELL L.
REV . 227, 232 n.20 (2010) (demonstrating that eleven early state constitutions
contained “law of the land” provisions and the two other states had “structural
constitutions” or retained their colonial charter).
104. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 74, at 1782 (“The first,
central, and largely uncontroversial meaning of ‘due process of law,’ the
meaning established in Magna Charta and applied vigorously by Coke against
the first two Stuart Kings, was that the executive may not seize the property
or restrain the liberty of a person within the realm without legal authority
arising either from established common law or from statute. In other words,
executive decrees are not ‘law’”). The provision’s focus on executive restraint is
evident in the early colony charters. See The Body of Liberties 1641, reprinted
in A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COLONY FROM 1630
TO 1686 33 (William H. Whitmore ed. 1890) (“No mans life shall be taken
away, no mans honour or good name shall be stayned, no mans person shall be
arested, restrayned, banished, dismembred . . . unlesse it be by vertue or
equitie of some expresse law of the Country waranting the same, established
by a general Court and sufficiently published . . . .”).
105. Although active only by implication, the “law of the land” provision’s
restraint on legislative action was nevertheless broadly recognized by several
early state courts. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 74, at 1707-08
(describing the Pennsylvania case of Isaac Austin where a land dispute was
resolved by legislature act and “every branch of the Pennsylvania government
concluded that the special and retrospective act . . . was beyond the
legislature’s constitutional power”) (citations omitted); Id. at 1709 (describing
the 1778 case of Holmes v. Walton where the New Jersey Supreme Court
voided a legislative act that vested a small claims court with six jury members
and no right of appeal to hear claims involving goods carried from British
territories back to New Jersey because it was “contrary to the constitution of
New Jersey” and “contrary to . . . the Law of the Land”) (citations omitted); Id.
at 1710 (describing the 1786 Rhode Island case of Trevett v. Weeden where a
statute permitting buyers to force merchants to accept inflated paper money at
face value in a “trial without any jury according to the laws of the land” was
“strikingly repugnan[t]” because the “law of the land” necessarily included the
right to trial by jury) (citations omitted); id. at 1713 (describing the 1786
North Carolina case Bayard v. Singleton where the North Carolina district
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the land,” when read literally, suggested that the legislature could
modify “the law,” some state courts rejected the provision’s
restraint on legislative authority. 106 It was in New York where
these conflicting interpretations were fully played out and
conclusively resolved.
Following the revolutionary war, New York passed a law
stripping loyalists of their citizenship. 107 Alexander Hamilton,
writing under the pseudonym “Phocion,” argued that such a
legislative act was “contrary to the law of the land” 108 because
legislatures cannot bypass judicial adjudications by passing
retrospective punishments. 109 “Law of the land,” Hamilton
stressed, meant “due process of law, that is by indictment or
presentment of good and lawful men, and trial and conviction in

court declared that a statute requiring courts to dismiss suits against
purchasers of forfeited Tory estates was unconstitutional because it deprived a
citizen of his ‘“right to a decision of his property by a trial by a jury”’
and ‘“ordered, that the suits in question should stand for trial in the next
term, according to the course of the common law of the land”’) (citations
omitted); see also Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244
(1819) (“As to the words from Magna Charta, incorporated into the
Constitution of Maryland after volumes spoken and written with a view to
their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this:
that they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of
private rights and distributive justice.”).
106. State v. ---, 2 N.C. 28, 29, 1 Hayw. 38, 50 (1794) (accepting the state’s
argument that the North Carolina’s law of the land clause gives the
legislature free reign to alter or amend such law).
107. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 74, at 1713.
108. Id. at 1714 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, A Letter from Phocion to
the Considerate Citizens of New York (Jan. 1-27, 1784), reprinted in 3 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 483-497 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke
eds., 1962). The Act, according to Hamilton, violated “[t]he 13th article of the
constitution [of New York],” Hamilton, supra note 108, which stated: “[n]o
member of this state shall be disfranchised or defrauded of any of the rights or
privileges sacred to the subjects of this state by the constitution, unless by the
law of the land or the judgment of his peers.” N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII, in
5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS : COLONIAL CHARTERS , AND O THER
O RGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES , TERRITORIES , AND COLONIES NOW OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES O F AMERICA [hereinafter THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS ] 2623, 2632 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed.,
1909)).
109. See Hamilton, A Letter from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of
New York (Jan. 1-27, 1784), supra note 108 (stating that the legislature
“cannot, without tyranny, disfranchise or punish whole classes of citizens by
general descriptions, without trial and conviction of offences known by laws
previously established declaring the offence and prescribing the penalty”)
(emphasis added); Id. at 483 (“The spirit of Whiggism, cherishes legal liberty,
holds the right of every individual sacred, condemns or punishes no man
without regular trial, and conviction of some crime declared by antecedent
laws . . .”) (emphasis added); Id. at 487 (“No citizen can be deprived of any
right which the citizens in general are entitled to, unless forfeited by some
offense”) (emphasis added).
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consequence.”110 The act before the New York legislature, however,
bypassed the judicial branch and rendered judgment ipse dixit. To
Hamilton, this was illegitimate and unconstitutional. Specifically,
Hamilton believed that “law of the land” was best interpreted as
“due process of law” and that “due process of law” mandated
certain modes of “process” to bring individuals to court (and a trial
in consequence). The legislature, therefore, cannot bypass those
requirements by preemptively rendering judgment through
legislation; legislatures may only create general and prospective

110. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 487 (“It has been seen that the
regular and constitutional mode of ascertaining whether this forfeiture has
been incurred, is by legal process, trial and conviction.”). This is what
Hamilton meant by the statement, “the words ‘due process’ have a precise
technical import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the
courts of justice . . . .” Hamilton, Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections,
New York Assembly (Feb. 6, 1787), supra note 60. Contrary to some erroneous
interpretations, Hamilton was not saying that due process of law does not
apply to the legislature or only restricts the courts; instead, he was saying that
individuals can only be deprived of their life, liberty, or property through
regular judicial determinations—not by legislative judgments. See id. The
Supreme Court later reiterated this same “law of the land” interpretation:
By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law; a law,
which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and
renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is, that every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the
protection of the general rules which govern society. Every thing which
may pass under the form of an enactment, is not, therefore, to be
considered the law of the land. If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of
pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and
acts directly transferring one man’s estate to another, legislative
judgments, decrees, and forfeitures, in all possible forms, would be the
law of the land.
Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 1819 U.S.
LEXIS 330, at *82 (1819). Webster’s law of the land argument centered on a
substantive due process of law interpretation of the clause, which, as
explained above, rests upon a separation-of powers-doctrine. Not surprisingly,
therefore, Webster’s separation of powers argument was nearly identical:
By these acts, the legislature assumes to exercise a judicial power. It
declares a forfeiture, and resumes franchises, once granted, without
trial or hearing. If the constitution be not altoge ther wastepaper, it has
restrained the power of the legislature in these particulars. If it has
any meaning, it is, that the legislature shall pass no act directly and
manifestly impairing private property, and private privileges. It shall
not judge, by act. It shall not decide by act. It shall not deprive, by act.
But it shall leave all these things to be tried and adjudged by the law of
the land.
Id. at *80. Crucially, Webster’s substantive due process of law argument in
Woodward was widely considered the correct interpretation of the Due Process
Clause for several decades thereafter. See COOLEY, supra note 102, at 353 (“No
definition [of the “law of the land” clause], perhaps, is more often quoted than
that by Mr. Webster in the Dartmouth College case . . . .”).
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rule of conduct. 111 As discussed below, these events in New York,
along with Hamilton’s interpretation of the “law of the land” as
“due process of law,” directly influenced the Framers’ (particularly
James Madison’s) adoption of the term “due process of law” in the
Fifth Amendment as well as the nation’s understanding of the
term in general.

C. The United States Constitution and Due Process of
Law
The unamended 1787 Constitution included a number of
provisions that guaranteed, in part, both procedural due process of
law and substantive due process of law. Explicitly, the
Constitution safeguarded procedural due process of law by
declaring that “[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it,”112 and that “[t]he trial of all crimes,
except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial
shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been
committed.”113 Implicitly, the Constitution’s drafters relied upon
the continuation and importance of the common law, with all of its
ancient immunities and protections. 114 Regarding substantive due

111. See Hamilton, A Letter from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of
New York (Jan. 1-27, 1784), supra note 108 (stating that the legislature
“cannot, without tyranny, disfranchise or punish whole classes of citizens by
general descriptions, without trial and conviction of offences known by laws
previously established declaring the offence and prescribing the penalty”)
(emphasis added).
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
113. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
114. See Statement of Violations of Rights (October 14, 1774), supra note
85 (“Resolved, N.C.D. 5. That the respective colonies are entitled to the
common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable
privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the cour se of
that law”); Northwest Ordinance Art. 2, SECOND CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
(1787) (“Art. 2. The inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to
the benefits . . . of judicial proceedings according to the course of the common
law”). Textualists and Originalists have difficulty explaining that the unamended Constitution was purposely framed around a system of law that
would have protected all of those deep-rooted privileges and immunities firmly
entrenched in the common law, many of which would later be attached to the
Constitution in the first eight Amendments. Courts were expected to preserve
and protect the People’s fundamental common law rights from executive and
legislative incursion, just as they did during the Stamp Act and during the
Articles of Confederation. See Edmund Randolph, Suggestions for the
Conciliation of the Small States (July 10, 1787), in 4 THE FOUNDERS '
CONSTITUTION 597 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“[A]ny
individual conceiving himself injured or oppressed by the partiality or
injustice of a law of any particular State may resort to the National Judiciary,
who may adjudge such law to be void, if found contrary to the principles of
equity and justice”).
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process of law, the unamended Constitution explicitly declared
that “[n]o bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed,” 115
and that “[n]o state shall . . . pass any bill of attainder, ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.” 116 By its
very structure and design, the Constitution recognized and gave
full effect to the separation-of-powers doctrine. 117
These provisions, however, were by no means exhaustive. In
fact, one of the arguments in favor a Bill of Rights—which turned
one of the strongest argument against a Bill of Rights on its
head—was that the inclusion of some common law protections in

115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 440
(1965) (“[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow, technical
(and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an
implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against
legislative exercise of the judicial function or more simply - trial by
legislature.”) (emphasis added).
117. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The entire legislature can
perform no judiciary act . . . .”); Id. (quoting Montesquieu) (“‘Were the power of
judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator.’”);
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 123-34 (Lilly & Wait
1832) (“The concentrating [of the three branches of a government] in the same
hands is precisely the definition of despotic government . . . . “If therefore the
legislature assumes executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to
be made; nor, if made, can it be effectual; because in that case they may put
their proceedings into the form of an act of assembly, which will render them
obligatory on the other branches. They have accordingly, in many instances,
decided rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy . . . .”);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887) (“[I]t is a fundamental principle in
our institutions, indispensable to the preservation of public liberty, that one of
the separate departments of government shall not usurp powers committed by
the Constitution to another department”); MD. CONST. of 1776 art. 8, reprinted
in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS , supra note 108, at 1686, 1742
(“That the legislative, executive and judicial powers of government, ought to
be forever separate and distinct from each other . . . .”); G A. CONST. of 1777,
art. I, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS , supra note
108, at 777, 778 (“The legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall
be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly
belonging to the other.”); MASS . CONST. of 1780, art. XXX, reprinted in 3 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS , supra note 108, at 1888, 1893 (“In the
government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive
shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of the m; the
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of
them; to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of men.”); VT. CONST.
of 1793, Ch. 2, § 6, reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS ,
supra note 108, at 3762, 3765 (“The Legislative, Executive and Judiciary
departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the
powers properly belonging to the other.”). Judicial review in early America
consistently focused on the separation of powers and legislative adjudications.
See William M. Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV .
455, 460 (2005) (demonstrating that pre-Marbury judicial review focused on
“invalidat[ing] statutes that trenched on judicial authority and autonomy.”) .
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the unamended Constitution (such as trial by jury in criminal
cases), implied the exclusion of other important common law
protections and immunities (such as trial by jury in civil cases or
the right against self-incrimination). 118 Therefore, it is reasonable
to infer that the Framers drafted the Constitution (even absent a
Bill of Rights) with the intention and expectation that the many
deep-rooted common law immunities would remain intact and
inviolate, as they had in England for hundreds of years, and as
they had in the colonies before British overreach in the mideighteenth century. That is why the “Federalists,” who fully
embraced inviolate common law rights, and who vociferously
opposed their abrogation by Parliament leading up to the
Revolution, nevertheless opposed the addition of a Bill of Rights to
the Constitution. 119 Among their many fears of including a Bill of
Rights was the implication, which seems unfortunately strong
today, that the inclusion of several fundamental common law
rights would imply the exclusion of other equally important rights.
The Ninth Amendment was thus inserted into the first set of
Amendments in order to quell this concern by constitutionally
recognizing the existence, importance, and inviolability of other,
unenumerated fundamental common law immunities and
protections. 120
Among the list of amendments James Madison presented to
Congress in the summer of 1789 was the requirement that “[n]o
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”121 Madison’s proposed and ultimately ratified
provision is important for two reasons. First, Madison’s use of “due
118. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 456 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1851)
(James Madison) (“It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage
those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow,
by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to
be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently
insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged
against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it
may be guarded against.”).
119. See Gedicks, supra note 74, at 636 (“Federalist arguments rested on
the twin assumptions that natural and customary rights e xisted
independently of the federal Constitution or any other text, and that the
federal judiciary would be empowered to invalidate acts of Congress or state
legislatures intruding upon such rights.”).
120. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 452 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1851) (James
Madison) (“The exceptions here or else-where in the constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge the powers
delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers,
or a inserted merely for greater caution”). To the extent that they are
recoverable, these rights should be recognized and protected as rights “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
121. See U.S. CONST. amend V.

2016]

Implicit In The Concept Of Ordered Liberty

1043

process of law” instead of the more prevalent “law of the land” was
almost certainly provoked by the New York’s “law of the land”
dispute, 122 as New York was the only state that proposed using the
term “due process of law” in the Bill of Rights. 123 Madison
regularly consulted with New Yorker Hamilton as a co-author of
the Federalist Papers, and Madison’s proposal inserted the “due
process” provision in Article I, Section 9 (which listed limitations
on the legislature) and after Clause 3 (which prohibited legislative
judgments in the form of bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws). 124 Although the Constitution’s provision against bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws banned specific forms of
legislative judgments, the addition of the “due process of law”
clause arguably effectuated a general constitutional ban on
legislative adjudications. 125 As Hamilton had stressed during the
New York controversy, “due process of law” meant that only courts
of justice—via fundamental common law modes and procedures—
can punish; the legislature can only pass general and prospective
rules of conduct. 126
When the Fifth Amendment was proposed and ratified,
therefore, “due process of law” not only preserved deep-rooted
common law “procedural” rights; it also mandated that the
legislature pass only “general and prospective rule of conduct”
when deprivation of rights are at stake. The most comprehensive
and correct early explications of this provision, which capture both
its procedural and substantive implications, are found in Hoke v.
Henderson,127 Taylor v. Porter,128 and Wynehamer v People. 129130

122. See Alexander Hamilton, A Letter from Phocion to the Considerate
Citizens of New York (Jan. 1-27, 1784), reprinted in supra 3 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 108, at 483-97.
123. Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word “Due,” 38 AKRON L. REV . 1, 6
(2005) (“[t]he New York ratification convention first proposed the ‘due process’
language for inclusion in the Bill of Rights . . . .”).
124. Madison’s original placement of the provision as a restraint against
the legislature is consistent with Madison’s use of the phrase “due process of
law” instead of “law of the land.” See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433
(1856) (“But the meaning was rendered more clear by the paraphrase of this
article of Magna Charta, which was inserted in a subsequent statute securing
privileges to the people, passed in the reign of Edward III., in which the
clause, ‘but by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers,’ was changed
to the words, ‘without being brought to answer by due process of law.’ This
change shows that the object of the provision was, in part at least, to interpose
the judicial department of the government as a barrier against aggressions by
the other departments”).
125. See Chapman & McConnell, Due Process, supra note 74, at 1718-19.
126. See Alexander Hamilton, A Letter from Phocion to the Considerate
Citizens of New York (Jan. 1-27, 1784), reprinted in supra 3 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 108, at 483-97.
127. Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 1, 15-16 (1833) (“In reference to the
infliction of punishment and divesting of the rights of property, it has been
repeatedly held in this State, and it is believed, in every other of the Union,
that there are limitations upon the legislative power, notwithstanding those
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words; and that the clause itself means that such legislative acts, as profess in
themselves directly to punish persons or to deprive the citizen of his property,
without trial before the judicial tribunals, and a decision upon the matter of
right, as determined by the laws under which it vested, according to the
course, mode and usages of the common law as derived from our forefathers,
are not effectually ‘laws of the land,’ for those purposes.”). This was more or
less the same interpretation the North Carolina Supreme Court handed down
28 years earlier. See Trustees of the Univ. of North Carolina v. Foy and Bishop
5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 57, 63 (1805) (“[I]ndividuals shall not be so deprived of their
liberties or properties, unless by a trial by Jury in a Court of Justice, according
to the known and establish rules of decision, derived from the common law . . .
. [and] [t]he property vested in the Trustees must remain for the uses intended
for the University, until the Judiciary of the country in the usual and common
form, pronounce them guilty of such acts, as will, in law, amount to a
forfeiture of their rights or dissolution of their body.”).
128. Taylor v. Porter & Ford, 4 Hill 140, 145-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (“The
words ‘law of the land,’ as here used, do not mean a statute passed for the
purpose of working the wrong. That construction would render the restriction
absolutely nugatory, and turn this part of the constitution into mere nonsense
. . . . [t]he meaning of the section, then, seems to be, that no member of the
state shall be disfranchised of any of his rights and privileges, unless the
matter be adjudged against him upon trial had according to the course o f the
common law. It must be ascertained judicially that he has forfeited his
privileges . . . [by] a prosecution or suit instituted and conducted according to
the prescribed forms and solemnities for ascertaining guilt, or determining the
title to property”). This decision is consistent with the earlier New York case,
Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686, 707 (1824) (“If [the right of office] is taken from
none but malefactors, in punishment for offences declared by law, and
ascertained in the due course of justice, the sense of the whole constitution, is
maintained . . . .”).
129. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 392-93 (1856) (Comstock, J.) (“To
say, as has been suggested, that ‘the law of the land,’ or ‘due process of law,’
may mean the very act of legislation which deprives the citizen of his rights,
privileges or property, leads to a simple absurdity. The constitution would
then mean, that no person shall be deprived of his property or rights, unless
the legislature shall pass a law to effectuate the wrong, and this would be
throwing the restraint entirely away. The true interpretation of these
constitutional phrases is, that where rights are acquired by the citizen under
the existing law, there is no power in any branch of the government to take
them away; but where they are held contrary to the existing law, or are
forfeited by its violation, then they may be taken from him--not by an act of
the legislature, but in the due administration of the law itself, before the
judicial tribunals of the state”); Id. at 477 (Selden, J, concurring) (“Either the
guarantee of a judicial trial, according to the course of the common law, is a
nullity, or this provision is void. But I am prepared to go further, and to hold
that all those fundamental rules of evidence which, in England and in this
country, have been generally deemed essential to the due administration of
justice, and which have been acted upon and enforced by every court of
common law for centuries, are placed by the constitution beyond the reach of
legislation. They are but the rules which reason applies to the investigation of
truth, and are of course in their nature unchangeable. If it does not follow that
to determine what they are, as applicable to judicial proceedings, is a judicial
and not a legislative power, still they must necessarily be included in the
phrase, ‘due process of law.’ If this be not the true interpretation of the
constitution; if the legislature, in addition to declaring what acts and what
intentions shall be criminal, can also dictate to courts and juries the evidence,
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Save for these exceptional expositions, most court decisions
focused either upon procedural due process of law or upon
substantive due process of law.

D. Modern Substantive Due Process
Because it is the role and duty of the courts to “tell what the
law is,”131 because courts must follow the Constitution over
conflicting laws, 132 and because the Constitution’s Due Process
Clause prohibits legislative judgments, it is the duty of judges to
invalidate all legislative acts that assume the character of an
adjudication. 133 The crucial question, therefore, is what constitutes
and change the legal presumptions upon which they shall convict or acquit,
there is no barrier to legislative despotism; and the separation of the
legislative and judicial departments of the government, the guarantee of trial
by jury, and of a trial according to the course of the common law, have all
failed to afford any substantial security to individual rights.”). This decision
was an enlargement of the explication given by the court just two years prior.
See Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202. 209 (1854) (“Due process of law
undoubtedly means, in the due course of legal proceedings, according to those
rules and forms which have been established for the protection of private
rights. Such an act as the legislature may, in the unco ntrolled exercise of its
powers, think fit to pass, is, in no sense, the process of law designated by the
constitution”). Although its interpretation was arguably overextended in some
instances, Wynehamer’s influence was, nonetheless, important and extensive.
See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120
YALE L.J. 408, 469 n.280 (2010) (“Though courts in most other states rejected
the specific holding of Wynehamer, namely that prohibition legislation
violated the due process and law-of-the-land provisions of state constitutions .
. . the decision itself was approvingly cited by multiple courts and
constitutional treatise writers around the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s enactment.”).
130. The United States Supreme Court cited Hoke and Taylor in its first
comprehensive treatment of the Due Process Clause in 1856. See Murray’s
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 280 (1856).
131. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
132. See id. at 180 (“[A] law repugnant to the constitution is void . . . .”).
133. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884) (stating that
“[i]t is not every act, legislative in form, that is law. Law is something more
than mere will exerted as an act of power” and excluding, as not due process of
law, “legislative judgments and decrees, and other similar special, partial and
arbitrary exertions of power under the forms of legislation” because
“[a]rbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the persons and
property of its subjects, is not law, whether manifested as the decree of a
personal monarch or of an impersonal multitude.”); see also Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. 386, 388-89 (1798) (condemning ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and
bills of pains and penalties as “legislative judgments” and “exercise[s] of
judicial power” and stating that such “acts” of the legislature “cannot be
considered a rightful exercise of legislative autho rity”); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me.
326, 331 (1825) (“[I]f the legislature undertake to exercise judicial power, they
invade the province of the judiciary; because the constitution and the laws
have placed all the judicial power in other hands.”); Jones’ Heirs v. Perry, 18
Tenn. 59, 74-75 (1836) (“[T]he legislature is not sovereign; that it is not the
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a “legislative judgment?” As discussed above, “law”—in the context
of a deprivation of rights134—is a “general and prospective rule of
conduct”135 while a “judgment” is a “special and retroactive
punishment.” A legislative act assumes the character of a
judgment, therefore, when it is not “generally applicable,” when it
is not “prospective,” or when it is not a “rule of conduct.”
Accordingly, because “special” legislative acts are not generally
applicable, it is arguably the duty of the courts to invalidate
them. 136 Likewise, because retroactive laws are not prospective, it
constituent of the courts, nor are they its agents; and that any assumption by
the legislature of powers conferred by the constitution upon the judiciary is as
destitute of authority as it would be in the courts were they, instead of
adjudging what the law is, to undertake the exercise of legislative powers and
to prescribe what it shall be.”); Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 391 (“I entertain no
doubt that, aside from the special limitations of the constitution, the
legislature cannot exercise powers which are in their nature essentially
judicial or executive. These are, by the constitution, distributed to other
departments of the government.”); id. 392-93 (“To say, as has been suggested,
that ‘the law of the land,’ or ‘due process of law,’ may mean the very act of
legislation which deprives the citizen of his rights, privileges or property, leads
to a simple absurdity. The constitution would then mean, that no person shall
be deprived of his property or rights, unless the legislature shall pass a law to
effectuate the wrong, and this would be throwing the restraint entirely away.
The true interpretation of these constitutional phrases is, that where rights
are acquired by the citizen under the existing law, there is no power in any
branch of the government to take them away; but where they are held
contrary to the existing law, or are forfeited by its violation, then they may be
taken from him--not by an act of the legislature, but in the due administration
of the law itself, before the judicial tribunals of the state”); Windsor v.
McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 278 (1876) (stating that the purported “law” at issue
was “in fact a mere arbitrary edict, clothed in the form of a judicial sentence”).
134. Legislative acts that do not deprive persons of their rights, but rather
recognize or restore their rights, arguably may be both special and
retrospective, yet still considered “law.” See Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn.
209, 221-222 (1822) (acknowledging the normally unjust nature of retroactive
deprivations of rights but maintaining that “laws of a retroactive nature,
affecting the rights of individuals, not adverse to equitable principle, and
highly promotive of general good, have been passed, and as often approved . . .
the retrospective law, thus far operating on vested rights, is admitted to be
unquestionably valid, because it is manifestly just”); Jones’ Heirs, 18 Tenn. at
78-79 (“Several cases have been referred to where special laws have been
declared constitutional by this court . . . . These cases were all determined
upon the principle that they deprived no one of a right, but were enacted to
advance the remedy of a party whose right already existed. If they were
susceptible of that construction--and we think they were--then no one would
doubt their constitutionality.”). Additionally, legislative acts that take liberty
and property for the necessary existence and administration of gov ernment
(i.e., military service, taxes) are “law.”
135. See Lewis, 3 Me. at 333 (1825) (“A law is defined as ‘a rule of civil
conduct.’ Hence it must in its nature be general and prospective; a rule for all,
and binding on all. It is the province of the legislature to make and establish
laws; and it is the province and duty of Judges to expound and apply them”)
(citation omitted).
136. See JOHN LOCKE , SECOND TREATISE OF G OVERNMENT 9 (1690)
(Jonathan Bennett ed., 2008) (defining law as a “standing Rule to live by,
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common to every one in the society in questions . . . .”) (emphasis added);
Chapman & McConnell, supra note 74, at 1712 (quoting Protest (Dec. 28,
1785), in THE JOURNALS OF THE G ENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTHCAROLINA 51, 51 (2d pagination series, Newbern, N.C., Arnett & Hodge 1786))
(discussing the dissenting legislators’ objections to a North Carolina statute
that required courts to dismiss suits against purchasers of forfeited Tory
estates, including the objection that “the law of the state mu st be generally
applicable to all citizens, and laws that effectively deprive some citizens of the
rights usually enjoyed by all would be ‘a denial of the known and established
rules of justice’”)); Fletcher v. Peck, 6 U.S. (Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) (Marshall,
J.) ”) (“It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules
for the government of society; the application of these rules to individuals in
society would seem to be the duty of other departments.”) (emphasis added);
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 1819
U.S. LEXIS 330, at *82 (1819) (argument of Daniel Webster) (“By the law of
the land is most clearly intended the general law; a law, which hears before it
condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after
trial. The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property,
and immunities, under the protection of the general rules which govern
society”) (emphasis added); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884)
(“It is not every act, legislative in form, that is law. Law is something more
than mere will exerted as an act of power. It must be not a special rule for a
particular person or a particular case . . . . The enforcement of these
limitations by judicial process is the device of self-governing communities to
protect the rights of individuals and minorities, as well against the power of
numbers as against the violence of public agents transcending the limits of
lawful authority, even when acting in the name and wielding the force of the
government”); id. (excluding, as not due process of law, “legislative judgments
and decrees, and other similar special, partial and arbitrary exertions of power
under the forms of legislation”); Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692, 697 (1891)
(stating that due process requires “laws operating on all alike”); Wall’s Heirs
v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. 554, 555-57 (1831) (stating that “the clause ‘law of the
land’ means a general public law, equally binding upon every member of the
community. The rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same rule
or law that governs every other member of the body politic, or land, under
similar circumstances; and every partial or private law which directly
proposes to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the same thing by
affording remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitutional and
void. . . . The part of the constitution referred to was intended to secure to
weak and unpopular minorities and individuals equal rights with the
majority, who, from the nature of our government, exercise the legislative
power. Any other construction of the constitution would set up the majority in
the government as a many-headed tyrant, with capacity and power to oppress
the minority at pleasure, by odious laws binding on the latter”); In re Dorsey,
7 Port. 293, 1838 Ala. LEXIS, at *62 (Ala. 1838) (“It is the first principle of the
jurisprudence of a free people, having written constitutions, that legislation
must be general in its action, and not individuated . . . [a] legislature would be
the most dangerous of all despotisms, if it may single out one class of
individuals, and deprive them of all the benefits of our system of laws, in
exclusion to others, or make one class of citizens, the victims of its policy,
when others, are untouched by its action.”); Ex parte Woods, 3 Ark. 532, 536
(1841) (stating that the state constitution’s law-of-the-land provision requires
“general law[s]”); Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 180-81 (1892) (“If the general
assembly may thus deprive some persons of substantial privileges allowed to
other persons under precisely the same conditions, it is manifest that it may,
upon like principle, deprive still other persons of other privileges in
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is arguably the duty of the courts to invalidate them. 137 Lastly,
because legislative acts that lack causes of forfeiture are not rules
of conduct, it is arguably the duty of the courts to invalidate
them. 138
contracting which, under precisely the same circumstances, are enjoyed by all
but the prohibited class; and it can hardly be admissible that the legislative
determination that the facts are such as to warrant this discrimination is
conclusive, for that would make the general assembly omnipotent, since, if
that were so, there could be nothing but its own discretion to control its action
in regard to every liberty enjoyed by the citizen; and it might find that the
public welfare required that society should be divided into an indefinite
number of classes, each possessing or being denied privileges in contracting
and acquiring property, as favoritism or caprice might dictate.”); Anderson v.
Bd. of Comm’rs of Cloud Cnty., 95 P. 583, 586 (Kan. 1908) (“When it acts upon
a public bill, the legislature legislates; when it acts upon a private bill, it
adjudicates. It passes from the function of a lawmaker to that of a judge.”).
137. See Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272, 277 (1804) (“To
declare what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power; to declare what the
law is to be, is legislative. One of the fundamental principles of all our
government is that the legislative power shall be separated from the
judicial.”); see also Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 553-54
(1852) (“[A] special act of Congress, passed afterwards, depriving the appellees
of the right to [construct and use planing machines that were purchased and
paid for] certainly could not be regarded as due process of law.”); Dash v. Van
Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 502 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (Kent, J.) (“It is a principle in
the English common law, as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its
omnipotent parliament, is not to have a retrospective effect”); Price v. Hopkin,
13 Mich. 318, 319 (1865) (“An act of the legislature is not to be construed to
operate retrospectively, so as to take away a vested right.”); Wallace
Mendelson, A Missing Link in the Evolution of Due Process, 10 VAND. L. REV .
125, 127 (1956) (“Such measures of special rather than general, and
retrospective rather than prospective, application smack of the judicial
decree.”).
138. See Calder, 3 U.S. at 388 (stating that legislatures must “establish
rules of conduct”); see also LOCKE , supra note 136, at 9 (defining “law” as a
“standing Rule to live by”); Alexander Hamilton, A Letter from Phocion to the
Considerate Citizens of New York (Jan. 1-27, 1784), reprinted in supra 3 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 108, at 483-97 (“No citizen can
be deprived of any right which the citizens in general are intitled to, unless
forfeited by some offence.”) (emphasis added); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113,
134 (1875) (describing law, in the context of the due process clause, as a “rule
of conduct”); Trustees of the Univ. of North Carolina v. Foy and Bishop 5 N.C.
(1 Mur.) 57, 63 (1805) (“[I]ndividuals shall not be so deprived of their liberties
or properties, unless by a trial by Jury in a Court of Justice, according to the
known and establish rules of decision, derived from the common law . . . . [and]
[t]he property vested in the Trustees must remain for the uses intended for
the University, until the Judiciary of the country in the usual and common
form, pronounce them guilty of such acts, as will, in law, amount to a forfeiture
of their rights or dissolution of their body .”). In other words, individuals only
give up as much of their rights as necessary for the due maintenance and
administration of government (i.e., taxes, militia service, catching fleeing
felons, imminent domain, etc.); otherwise, individuals enjoy their life, liberty
and property free from government interference until they “forfeit” those
rights by the conviction of some public offense. See Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (stating that an individual’s “indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property” can only be “forfeited
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Indeed, without a cause of forfeiture, a legislative act is an
adjudication, not a law. It does not, as law must, “declar[e] a
penalty for a prohibited act.”139 Instead, such legislative edicts
merely render judgment—in direct violation of the Due Process
Clause. 140 Nearly every court in the early republic voided
legislative acts that lacked rules of conduct (such as those that
confiscated property without a cause of forfeiture). 141 Following the
by her conviction of some public offense”).
139. Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & Serg., 171, 173 (1843) (defining law as a
“pre-existent rule of conduct, declarative of a penalty for a prohibited act . . .
.”); Ex parte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 13 (S.D. Ga. 1866) (“The design and object of a
law is to regulate conduct; to prescribe and fix a rule or guide for it.”).
Government-granted monopolies, for example, deprive individuals of their
right to sell a specific good or practice a specific trade without any cause of
forfeiture, thereby violating the Due Process Clause. See Edward Coke, supra
note 73, at 47(including “monopolies” as an example of a violation of Magna
Carta’s “Law of the Land” provision).
140. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897)
(stating that a legislative act that takes private property without just
compensation “would be treated not as an exertion of legislative power, but as
a sentence -- an act of spoliation”); see also Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 603, 624 (1869) (striking down legislation that compelled persons who
held contracts for the payment of gold to accept paper currency of “inferior
value” because such a legislative act took property without a cause of
forfeiture in violation of the Due Process Clause); In Re Sinking Fund Cases,
99 U.S. 700, 738 (1878) (Strong, J. dissenting) (“A statute undertaking to take
the property of A. and transfer it to B. is not legislation. It would not be a law.
It would be a decree or sentence, the right to declare which, if it exists at all, is
in the Judicial Department of the government.”); Taylor v. Porter & Ford, 4
Hill 140, 147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (“If the legislature can take the property of
A. and transfer it to B., they can take A. himself, and either shut him up in
prison, or put him to death. But none of these things can be done by mere
legislation. There must be ‘due process of law.’”). Absent emergency
circumstances, the Due Process Clause forbids direct punishment through any
other means except for the fundamentally fair modes and forms of a judicial
adjudication. This means that the legislature cannot directly punish (or
deprive an individual of her life, liberty, or property); it may only prospectively
prescribe a penalty for a prohibited act. As Hamilton put it: “No citizen can be
deprived of any right which the citizens in general are intitled to, unless
forfeited by some offense.” Alexander Hamilton, A Letter from Phocion to the
Considerate Citizens of New York (Jan. 1-27, 1784), reprinted in supra 3 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 108, at 483-97. This is what
Justice Taney was arguing in the Dred Scott case. See Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856) (“An act of Congress which deprives a citizen of
the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or
brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who
had committed no offense against the laws, can hardly be dignified with the
name of due process of law”) (emphasis added). The problem with Taney’s
augment, as pointed out by Abraham Lincoln, was that the Justice treated
“negroes [as] property in the same sense that hogs and horses are”—even
though this was “notoriously not so.” Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield,
Illinois (Oct. 4, 1854), reprinted in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS O F ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 245 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
141. See Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 658 (1829) (Story, J.) (“We know
of no case in which a legislative act to transfer the property of A. to B. without
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logic of substantive due process to this point, the following
question inevitably arises: What if the legislature creates a bogus
or sham cause of forfeiture? If the Due Process Clause commands
the judiciary to void all legislative judgments, and if legislative
acts without causes of forfeiture constitute legislative judgments,
then surely the judiciary must also have the authority to void
legislative acts that employ bogus causes of forfeiture. 142 This
must be so or the legislature could arguably circumvent the Due
Process Clause’s “cause of forfeiture” requirement by rationalizing
all legislative judgments with bogus causes of forfeiture. 143 A
legislature’s cause of forfeiture, therefore, cannot be a mere
pretext for a deprivation of rights. Such is the logical, albeit longdelayed, conclusion of the Due Process Clause’s implied
prohibition of legislative judgments.
his consent has ever been held a constitutional exercise of legislative power in
any state in the Union. On the contrary, it has been constantly resisted as
inconsistent with just principles by every judicial tribunal in which it has been
attempted to be enforced.”).
142. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905) (“Upon what
sound principles as to the relations existing between the different
departments of government can the court review this action of the legislature?
If there is any such power in the judiciary to review legislative action in
respect of a matter affecting the general welfare, it can only be when that
which the legislature has done comes within the rule that if a statute
purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals
or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is,
beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the
fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give
effect to the Constitution.”) (citations omitted); see also Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (“[The legislature’s] determination as to what is a proper
exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the courts”); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897)
(“When and how far such power may be legitimately exercised with regard to
these subjects must be left for determination to each case as it arises.”).
143. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (Harlan, J.)
(explaining that the judiciary must strike down legislative acts if “it is
apparent that its real object is not to protect the community, or to promote the
general wellbeing, but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive the
owner of his liberty and property without due process of law”) ; see also
Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129, 137 (1873) (Bradley, J. concurring) (stating
that a state violates the Due Process Clause when “the police regulation [is] a
mere pretext . . . [for] an invasion of the right of the citizen . . . .”); id. at 138
(Field, J. concurring) (“[U]nder the pretence of prescribing a police regulation,
the state c[an] not be permitted to encroach upon any of the just rights of the
citizen, which the Constitution intended to guard against abridgment . . . “);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (“[T]here is a limit to the valid
exercise of the police power by the State. . . . Otherwise the Fourteenth
Amendment would have no efficacy, and the legislatures of the States would
have unbounded power, and it would be enough to say that any piece of
legislation was enacted to conserve the morals, the health or the safety of the
people; such legislation would be valid no matter how absolutely without
foundation the claim might be. . . . The claim of the police power would be a
mere pretext -- become another and delusive name for the supreme
sovereignty of the State to be exercised free from constitutional restraint.”).
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If the Due Process Clause necessarily precludes bogus causes
of forfeiture, the question naturally follows: What constitutes a
bogus cause of forfeiture? Modern substantive due process theory
divides into two general schools of thought: (1) those who believe
that substantive due process does not permit the judiciary to
evaluate legislatures’ causes of forfeiture and (2) those who believe
that all arbitrary and irrational legislative acts constitute bogus
cause of forfeiture.
1.

Substantive Due Process as a General and Prospective
Rule of Conduct Only

While exhortations that substantive due process is an
“oxymoron”144 or a “contradiction in terms”145 do not square with
the Clause’s historical roots, logical implication, and long-standing
jurisprudential interpretation, the argument that substantive due
process is (at a certain point) illegitimate is a serious and wellfounded criticism. Specifically, so long as the legislature passes a
general and prospective rule of conduct, the judiciary’s authority to
assess the “reasonableness” of the legislature’s cause of forfeiture
is constitutionally questionable. 146 While it is certainly the role
and responsibility of the judiciary to void all laws that exceed
Congress’s (or a state’s) legislative authority, 147 and while the Due
Process Clause prohibits legislative judgments, determining what
is and what is not a legitimate exercise of a state’s police power is

144. U.S. v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
145. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 18 (1980).
146. This authority is implied from an already-implied imperative (the Due
Process’s Clause prohibition against legislative judgments), which is premised
on the implied power of the judicial branch to hold laws that violate the
Constitution void. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 138 (1803). Such an
awesome power—one that fundamentally transforms the balance of
government—should perhaps stand on a heavier foundation than an
implication within an implication within an implication. See Fletcher v. Peck,
10 U.S. 87, 128 (1810) (“[I]t is not on slight implication and vague conjecture
that the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its
acts to be considered as void. The opposition between the constitution and th e
law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their
incompatibility with each other.”).
147. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“[T]he courts must obey
the Constitution, rather than the lawmaking department of Government, and
must, upon their own responsibility, determine whether, in any particular
case, these limits have been passed.”).
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a radical assumption148 of judicial power—one that arguably
pushes the judiciary into the legislative domain. 149
At the same time, however, it can just as reasonably be
argued that (1) the Due Process Clause has a history of such
judicial assumptions of authority, 150 (2) this implication was wellestablished prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 151 and that (3) refusing to assume such a
responsibility prioritizes form over substance and arguably

148. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 92 (1908) (“There is no doubt
of the duty of this court to enforce the limitations and restraints whenever
they exist, and there has been no hesitation in the performance of the duty.
But whenever a new limitation or restriction is declared, it is a matter of grave
import, since, to that extent, it diminishes the authority of the State, so
necessary to the perpetuity of our dual form of government, and changes its
relation to its people and to the Union.”).
149. See Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903) (“No evils arising from
such legislation could be more far-reaching than those that might come to our
system of government if the judiciary, abandoning the sphere assigned to it by
the fundamental law, should enter the domain of legislation, and upon
grounds merely of justice or reason or wisdom annul statutes that had
received the sanction of the people’s representatives”); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 662
(maintaining that the Court “cannot, without usurping legislative functions,
override the will of the people as thus expressed by their chosen
representatives” because the Court has “nothing to do with the mere policy of
legislation”). While the authority of the judiciary is to say what the law is (and
via the Due Process Clause, what is “law”), it is the province of the legislature
to decide the need for and nature of such laws. See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces
of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 1061, 1079 (2008) (noting that “the most
prominent legal authority-based justification for [judicial] deference goes to
the heart of our constitutional structure: the separation of powers”).
150. From Coke first assuming the judicial power to void Parliamentary
acts that violate “common right and reason,” to pre -constitutional state
judiciaries assuming the authority to void legislation, to the Supreme Court’s
assumption of authority to invalidate laws that conflict w ith the Constitution,
the Anglo-American judiciary enjoys a rich and regarded tradition of assuming
awesome judicial authority by implication. See George P. Smith, Marbury v.
Madison, Lord Coke And Dr. Bonham: Relics Of The Past, Guidelines For The
Present-Judicial Review In Transition?, 2 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV . 255, 255
(1979); see also Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or
How the Marshall Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV . 787,
801 (1999).
151. See, e.g., CONG. G LOBE , 34TH CONG., 1ST SESS. app. 124 (1856)
(statement of Rep. Bingham) (emphasis added) (stating that a statute passed
by the legislature of the Kansas territory punishing abolitionist speech
“abridges the freedom of speech and of the press, and deprives persons of
liberty without due process of law . . . .”).
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constitutes a dereliction of duty. 152 The second school of thought
adopts this line of reasoning.
2.

Substantive Due Process Extends to All Arbitrary and
Unreasonable Legislative Acts

The second school of thought—the prevailing modern
approach—interprets the Due Process Clause as precluding “all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.”153
This approach recognizes that any government deprivation of an
individual’s life, liberty, and property must have a rational,
defensible justification—it cannot rely on a bogus or sham cause of
forfeiture. This is the most expansive and least objective
substantive due process interpretation; however, it also most fully
reflects the logical conclusion of the Clause’s prohibition on
legislative judgments. The theory holds as follows: Legislative acts
that deprive individuals of their life, liberty, and property must
include causes of forfeiture (lest they be mere legislative
judgments); those causes of forfeiture cannot be bogus and so must
rationally relate to a legitimate state police power; all activity that
does not rationally relate to a legitimate state police power falls
within “ordered liberty;” all causes of forfeiture based on “ordered
liberty” are necessarily void; therefore, all legislative acts that do
not rationally relate to a legitimate state police power are
necessarily void and unconstitutional.
While this conclusion may seem straightforward, it in fact
rests on three significant assumptions: (1) that state power is
limited, (2) that such limits can be defined, and (3) that the
judiciary has the authority to enforce those limits. Each of these
assumptions, however, arguably has some constitutional and
super-constitutional
support.
First,
the
Declaration
of
Independence and the Tenth Amendment make it clear that a
state’s police power is not unlimited. As set forth in the
Declaration of Independence, all political power in the United
States necessarily springs from The People154 and The People
152. See Booth v. People of State of Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 429 (1902)
(Harlan, J.) (stating that courts must look “through mere forms and at the
substance of the matter . . . .”); Jones’ Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. 59, 70-71 (1836)
(“If, by making an act of this kind purport to be a legislative resolve, it thereby
becomes a legislative and not a judicial act, all judicial power might be
usurped by the legislature and exercised constitutionally in the form of
legislative resolves.”); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to
Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (2009) (“Because the determination
of social facts is nearly always decisive in constitutional decision making,
blanket judicial deference would undermine the courts’ crucial responsibility
for protecting basic individual rights.”).
153. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see
also D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 687-88 (2008).
154. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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consensually delegate only a portion of that political authority to
establish a working government. 155 The Constitution explicitly
recognizes this limited delegation, wherein all political power is
partitioned into a three-tiered system of sovereignty: general but
enumerated political power is entrusted to the federal government,
wide-ranging but nonetheless limited power is entrusted to
respective state governments, 156 and the remaining political power
is reserved by and for The People. 157 It is this residual sovereignty
that comprises the concept of “private rights” 158 and “ordered
liberty.”159
Federal Power
State Power
Ordered
Liberty

Furthermore, the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century defined and

155. See U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 296 (1904) (Brewer,
J. concurring) (“The powers the people have given to the general government
are named in the Constitution, and all not there named, either expressly or by
implication, are reserved to the people, and can be exercised only by them, or
upon further grant from them.”).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people”) (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. See Munn v. Ill., 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876) (“‘A body politic’ . . . is a
social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws
for the common good.’ . . . [t]his does not confer power upon the whole people to
control rights which are purely and exclusively private . . . but it does authorize
the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so
use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another.”) (quoting MASS .
CONST. pmbl.) (emphasis added) .
159. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (“There is, of
course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy of h is
own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government,
especially of any free government existing under a written constitution, to
interfere with the exercise of that will.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003) (“It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter.”); JEFFERSON, supra note 117, at
292. (“The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are
injurious to others.”).
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limited state police power; 160 the Court’s Takings jurisprudence in
the second half of the nineteenth century further identified the
limits of that power in contradistinction to individual rights; 161
and, the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence since the
160. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 19 (1824) (“It was generally
qualified, by saying, that it was a power, by which the States could pass laws
on the subjects of commercial regulation, which would be valid until Congress
should pass other laws controlling them, or inconsistent with them, and that
then the State laws must yield.”); see also Mayor, Aldermen & Commonalty of
City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 118 (1837) (“I admit, in the most
unhesitating manner, that the states have a right to pass health laws and
quarantine laws, and other police laws, not contravening the laws of congress
rightfully passed under their constitutional authority.”); Thurlow v. Com. of
Mass., 46 U.S. 504, 524 (1847); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 474 (1866).
Both the Court’s limitation on state police power and its use of heightened
judicial scrutiny most likely migrated from its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. See Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472-74
(1877) (“While we unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary laws,
and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or property within its
borders . . . it may not interfere with transportation into or through the State,
beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. It may not, under
the cover of exerting its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either
foreign or inter-state commerce. . . . Regarding the statutes as mere police
regulations, intended to protect domestic cattle against infectious disease,
those courts have refused to inquire whether the prohibition did not extend
beyond the danger to be apprehended, and whether, therefore, the statutes
were not something more than exertions of police power. That inquiry, they
have said, was for the legislature and not for the courts. With this we cannot
concur. The police power of a State cannot obstruct foreign commerce or inter state commerce beyond the necessity for its exercise; and under color of it
objects not within its scope cannot be secured at the expense of the protection
afforded by the Federal Constitution. And as its range sometimes comes very
near to the field committed by the Constitution to Congress, it is the duty of
the courts to guard vigilantly against any needless intrusion.”); accord Chy
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) Not surprisingly, the Commerce
Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, and state police powers all intersected in
the Court’s trailblazing substantive due process cases. See Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 63 (1872); Munn, 94 U.S. at 123; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578, 590-592 (1897).
161. See e.g., Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497, 504 (1870) (“This riparian
right is property, and is valuable, and though it must be enjoyed in due
subjection to the rights of the public, it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously
destroyed or impaired. It is a right of which, when once vested, the owner can
only be deprived in accordance with established law, and if necessary that it
be taken for the public good, upon due compensation.”); see also Wadleigh v.
Gilman, 12 Me. 403, 405 (1835) (maintaining that the “[p] olice regulations
may [only] forbid such a use, and such modifications, of private property as
would prove injurious to the citizens generally.”). The move from arbitrary
takings to arbitrary infringement of other rights was inescapable. See Dent v.
W. Va., 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889) (“The interest, or, as it is sometimes
termed, the estate acquired in [occupations], that is, the right to continue their
prosecution, is often of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily
taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus
taken.”); Gilbert v. Minn., 254 U.S. 325, 343 (1920) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (“I
cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property.”).
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twentieth century has demonstrated the Court’s ability to navigate
the line between individual rights-based limitations on state police
power and the democratic will.162 The arc of this jurisprudence
reveals that the Court has long recognized that a state’s police
power is limited to the protection of persons and property, that
government restrictions on individual rights must rationally relate
to such protection, and that the Court must evaluate that rational
relation. A persuasive case can be made, therefore, that state
power is limited, that those limits can be defined, and that courts
have the ability, duty, and well-established jurisprudential
authority to enforce those limits.
This interpretation of the Due Process Clause has dominated
the Court’s jurisprudence for the last one-hundred and fifty years.
However, the dangerously broad scope of discretion inherent in
this form of judicial review, as well as the perceived historic
abuses arising from that discretion, 163 has over time led the Court
to construct self-imposed tiers of scrutiny to confine its discretion
in the substantive due process context. 164 The reason behind these
self-imposed tiers is simple: Because most legislative acts deprive
individuals of life, liberty or property, most legislative acts can be
challenged under the Due Process Clause. How closely judges
scrutinize those legislative acts and how meticulously they
evaluate the factual record thereof often determines the outcome
of the legal challenge. 165 While judicial scrutiny should be
162. See e.g., Herbert W. Titus, The Free Exercise Clause: Past, Present and
Future, 6 REGENT U. L. REV . 7, 10-11 (1995).
163. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE G ROWTH OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (1967); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY O F THE
SUPREME COURT 198 (1993); but see MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS , THE LOCHNER
COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO
THE 1930S 115 (2001); see also David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v.
New York: Impediment of the Growth of the Regulatory State, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 299, 299 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
164. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616 (2015) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“Our
precedents have . . . insisted that judges “exercise the utmost care” in
identifying implied fundamental rights, “lest the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the
Members of this Court.”); see also id. (“The need for restraint in administering
the strong medicine of substantive due process is a lesson this Court has
learned the hard way.”).
165. For example, even though the Lochner majority acknowledged that
the “liberty to contract” is subject to regulation pursuant to the state’s police
power (i.e., to the extent that the regulation relates “to the safety, health,
morals and general welfare of the public”), Lochner v. N.Y. 198 U.S. 45, 53
(1905), and that the state “has the power to prevent the individual from
making certain kinds of contracts,” it nevertheless struck down the 60 hour
work week law after closely scrutinizing it and determining that there was “no
reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free
contract by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.” Id. at
57. The four dissenting Justices, hearing the same arguments and reviewing
the same factual record, came to the opposite conclusion. See id. at 65-74
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consistent regardless of the wisdom or politics of the law being
challenged, history and human nature dictate otherwise. Often
times judges’ ideological predispositions and political allegiances
trigger extremely inconsistent applications of judicial scrutiny. 166
Such conscious or unconscious ideologically-motivated, politicallycharged swings of scrutiny erode judicial objectivity and
undermine public confidence in the judiciary. It also significantly
increases the risk that legitimate and sometime desperatelyneeded legislative measures will be nullified by illegitimate
judicial decisions.
Ultimately, the deep-seated fear of open-ended and
unrestrained judicial discretion in substantive due process
jurisprudence led the Court to mandate the use of a highly
deferential level of scrutiny167 in all but only handful of special
cases. 168 Only when legislative acts involve “fundamental rights”
do courts apply heightened scrutiny, wherein judges may closely
examine the legal and evidentiary justifications put forth in
support of the act. 169
This tiered scrutiny approach is designedly predictable:
legislative acts reviewed under strict scrutiny are almost always
struck down170 while legislative acts reviewed under rational-basis

(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
166. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) with McDonald v.
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
167. This level of scrutiny is known as rational basis review, wherein the
Court determines whether the act at issue bears a “rational relationship” to a
“legitimate governmental purpose,” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993),
and where “the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to
establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational
way.” Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) ; see also FCC
v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“In areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect
lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”). Such judicial
deference is arguably necessary to prevent courts from using substantive due
process as a pretext for striking down ideologically repugnant legislative acts.
168. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(enumerating the special circumstances that where the legislative acts should
be “subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny” or “call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry”); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)
(Harlan, J, dissenting) (stressing that “certain interests require particularly
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment”).
169. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014) (stating that a
legislative act that regulates a fundamental right “must be the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest”); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (stating that “the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids the government to infringe . . . ‘fundamental’ liberty
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”) (internal quotations
omitted).
170. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
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review are nearly always upheld. 171 As a result of this
determinative analytical framework, the most critical question in
the substantive due process analysis today is whether the
challenged act involves a “fundamental right.” 172 Naturally, how
courts determine what is and what is not a “fundamental right”
has become the crux of the modern substantive due process
debate. 173 Some jurists argue that “fundamental rights” should be
confined only to those rights explicitly recognized in the
Constitution or deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
traditions.”174 Other jurists argue that “fundamental rights”
should extend also to conduct essential to one’s self-determination
and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Each approach has
its force and its flaws. 175
a.

Substantive Due Process as Limited to Constitutional
Rights

The first approach limits the judiciary’s application of strict
scrutiny in substantive due process cases to explicitly recognized
constitutional rights. The reason behind such a limitation is
simple: If the judiciary is going to closely question the legitimacy
of legislative causes of forfeiture, then that authority ought to be
confined to only those causes that implicate rights explicitly
written into the Constitution. 176 Only under such circumstances

Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV . L. REV . 1, 8
(1972) (describing strict scrutiny as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”). But
see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV . 793, 796 (2006)
(“Overall, 30 percent of all applications of strict scrutiny--nearly one in three-result in the challenged law being upheld.”).
171. See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate
Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 798 (1987) (Under traditional
application of rational basis review, “legislation is presumptively
constitutional.”).
172. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI . L. REV . 1057, 1058 (1990).
173. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3059 (2010)
(Thomas, J. concurring) (“The one theme that links the Court's substantive
due process precedents together is their lack of a guiding principle to
distinguish
‘fundamental’
rights
that
warrant
protection
from
nonfundamental rights that do not.”).
174. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2618-23 (2015) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (“Our precedents have required that implied fundamental rights
be ‘objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ . . . to
ensure that when unelected judges strike down democratically enacted laws,
they do so based on something more than their own beliefs.”).
175. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“[C]hoices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”)).
176. To be sure, the Courts’ invocation of rights recognized elsewhere in
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can courts regularly strike down democratically-passed legislation
with the objectivity and conviction necessary to nullify democratic
majorities. Under no circumstance should courts unearth old
rights in the dust of history or forge new rights in the caldron of
enlightenment: they should confine themselves—as courts ought—
to the explicit dictates of the Constitution. 177 Otherwise, judges
heedlessly assume the role of historian or philosopher. 178
b.

Substantive Due Process as Limited to Rights Deeply
Rooted in our Nation’s History and Traditions

Squaring the circle of the Supreme Court’s substantive due
process precedent, the second approach extends the application of
heightened judicial scrutiny to rights “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.”179 This approach recognizes that
judicial nullification of democratically-passed laws must not turn
on the political preferences or policy judgments of nine (and
possibly five) unelected and unaccountable Justices. 180 Therefore,
the Constitution (such as the First Amendment) does not magically give the
Court the jurisdiction to enforce those rights. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S.
243, 250 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights “contain no expression
indicating an intention to apply them to the State governments. This court
cannot so apply them”). Unless courts invoke actual jurisdiction-bestowing
constitutional provisions (such as the Ninth Amendment for the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause for
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause), judges undeniably must
assume the authority to declare legislative acts illegitimate via the Due
Process Clause’s implied prohibition against legislative judgments. Indeed,
when courts enforce First Amendment rights against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, they are relying upon the Due
Process Clause’s implied prohibition on bogus causes of forfeiture. Such an
implication is by no means limited to Constitutional rights.
177. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963) (“States have
power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their
internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run
afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid
federal law.”) (quotations omitted).
178. See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 391-92 (1856) (“[A]side from
the special limitations of the constitution, the legislature cannot exercise
powers which are in their nature essentially judicial or executive. . . . It is only
the ‘legislative power’ which is vested in the senate and assembly. But where
the constitution is silent, and there is no clear usurpation of the powers
distributed to other departments, I think there would be great difficulty in
attempting to define the limits of this power. . . . I am reluctant to enter upon
this field of inquiry, satisfied as I am that no rule can be laid down in terms
which will not contain the germs of great mischief to society, by giving to
private opinion and speculation a license to oppose themselves to the
legitimate powers of government.”).
179. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (quoting
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
180. It should be noted that the academic exercise of locating rights
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” is not always objective.
Indeed, the inquiry often times entails ideological-driven bias in both the
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it confines the Court’s application of heightened (and often times
fatal) judicial scrutiny to historically linked, objectively
ascertained, and inherently limited circumstances. 181
c.

Substantive Due Process as Extended to Important
Conduct Implicit in the Concept of Ordered Liberty

The third approach extends the Court’s application of
heightened judicial scrutiny to especially important and personal
decisions. 182 This approach recognizes that fundamental rights
should not be frozen in time or defined by generations prior. 183
Such “privacy rights”184 and “liberty interests”185 embrace all

search for and interpretation of relevant and available historical evidence.
See Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 332
(2013) (“[O]riginalist judges approach the theory eclectically, drawing on
useful historical or textual evidence to support a desired conclusion.”); see also
id. at 331 (“[O]riginalism creates an especially misleading illusion of
certainty.”).
181. See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85
N.C. L. REV . 63, 93 (2006).
182. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (stating that
the Due Process Clause’s guarantee of liberty “extend[s] to certain personal
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices
that define personal identity and beliefs”); see also Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (quoting Carey v. Population
Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (stating that the Due Process Clause
protects an individual’s “independence in making certain kinds o f important
decisions”)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (stating that the Due
Process Clause protects “vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men”). There are other well-merited approaches; however,
they have yet to receive any jurisprudential support. See e.g., RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION O F
LIBERTY 4-5 (2004).
183. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (stating that this approach to
substantive due process “respects our history and learns from it without
allowing the past alone to rule the present”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172 (1952) (“‘[D]ue process of law’ requires . . . a judgment not ad hoc and
episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of
change in a progressive society.”).
184. See e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)
(recognizing an individual’s “zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (“[T]he
Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.”).
185. See e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. 486 (Goldberg, J. concurring) (concluding
that the “liberty” in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
“embraces the right of marital privacy”); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312
(1980) (recognizing that the liberty protected by the Due Process includes
“includes the freedom of a woman to decide whether to terminate a
pregnancy”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (recognizing that
“[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution” includes the right of adult
individuals to choose to engage in private and consensual sexual conduct
within the privacy of the home).
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conduct essential to an individual’s self-determination186 as
contained within deeply rooted and traditionally recognized
categories of fundamental rights.187 This approach is far narrower
than its opponents represent: It does not permit the Court to
attach “fundamental status” and heightened scrutiny to just any
conduct the Court—in its “reasoned judgment”—deems deserving.
Instead, this approach confines the Court’s application of
heightened scrutiny to those rights enclosed within deeply rooted
and historically recognized categories of fundamental rights. 188
The content of those categories, however, is informed by an everdeveloping understanding of liberty, as it is slowly stripped of the
prejudice and presumptions of generations past. 189 These rights,

186. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (“[C]hoices central to personal dignity and
autonomy . . . are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
187. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (“[O]ur laws and tradition afford
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education.”). Such categories also include private and consensual intimate
conduct, see id. at 562 (“Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of . . . certain intimate conduct.”), and bodily integrity. See Cruzan v.
Director of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing that “a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest [implicit in the Due
Process Clause] in refusing unwanted medical treatment”).
188. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (“[H]istory and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry.”) (quotations omitted); see also Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015
WL 4757633, *14 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (“Irrespective of the new interpretive
dimensions applied by the United States Supreme Court to address differing
applications of due process, the substantive fundamental rights that are
recognized to exist under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment have always originated from classic personal interactions or
embedded principles in our democratic society.”).
189. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (stating that
fundamental rights “rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how
constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own
era”); see also id. at 2596 (recognizing that “new dimensions of freedom become
apparent to new generations”); id. at 2598 (stating that “new insight reveals
discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal
stricture”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 848 (“Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific
practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the
Fourteenth Amendment protects.”); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (“[T]imes can
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”); Harper v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (“[W]e have never been co nfined to
historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a
fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of
fundamental rights.”). This approach is similar to the Court’s approach to the
application of heightened scrutiny in Equal Protection Clause cases. See e.g.,
Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 471 (2006):
We are told that when the Justices who decided Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), finally
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which include the right to use contraceptives, 190 the right of a
woman to terminate her own pregnancy, 191 the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, 192 the right to engage in consensual
sodomy, 193 and the right to marry a person of a different race are
certainly not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history or
traditions;”194 nonetheless, they are “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.”195

IV. THE OBERGEFELL COURT’S APPLICATION OF
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Although the Obergefell majority could have decided the case
exclusively on Equal Protection grounds, 196 it chose rather to

rejected legal segregation in public schools, they were deeply conflicted
over the issue. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and
Goodridge), 104 Mich. L.Rev. 431, 433 (2005). “The sources of
constitutional interpretation to which they ordinarily looked for
guidance—text, original understanding, precedent, and custom—
indicated that school segregation was permissible. By contrast, most of
the Justices privately condemned segregation, which Justice Hugo
Black called ‘Hitler’s creed.’ Their quandary was how to reconcile th eir
legal and moral views.”
Id. (footnote omitted).
190. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992) (quoting Carey, 431 U.S. at 678, 685 (1977) (recognizing that the
“liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes “personal decisions
relating to . . . contraception”).
191. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (“Roe recognized the right of a woman
to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny . . . .”). This right
is premised on the fiercely debated proposition that an unborn human life is
not a “person” (with full rights and protections) within the meaning of the
Constitution. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (“[T]he word “person,” as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”).
192. See Cruzan v. Director of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)
(recognizing that “a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest [implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause] in
refusing unwanted medical treatment”).
193. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (“The liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to make th[e] choice [to enter into
consensual sexual relationships]”).
194. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
195. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2618 (2015) (Robert, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (stating that, “as a
general rule,” the Due Process Clause “counsel[s] against attempts by the
State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its
boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law
protects”). As such, States cannot use this conduct as a basis for a legitimate
cause of forfeiture. See supra notes 154-59.
196. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484
(9th Cir. 2014) (stating that “heightened scrutiny applies to classifications
based on sexual orientation . . . ”); Lawson v. Kelly, 58 F. Supp. 3d 923, 934
(W.D. Mo. 2014) (finding that “[t]he State’s permission to marry depends on
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invoke substantive due process, relying on the interplay between
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to strike down the
respective state bans on same-sex marriage. Upon a close reading,
the majority’s analysis—distilled through the objections set forth
in the dissenting opinions—provides a reasonable and workable
foundation not only for “definitional” substantive due process
claims, but also for non-tradition-based substantive due process
claims in general.

A. The Majority Opinion
As explained above, the majority in Obergefell struck down
the respective state bans on same-sex marriage because in its
opinion those prohibitions violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 197 Since the
case did not involve universal denials of or restrictions on a
fundamental right, but rather prohibitions on a certain class of
persons from exercising what is a well-established fundamental
right for others, the majority’s substantive due process analysis
was far narrower than the dissent represents. 198 Specifically, the
majority analysis focused not on inventing a new right, but on
whether the exclusion of a certain class of individuals from the
definition of a fundamental right was constitutionally permissible.
This involved determining whether the states provided “a
sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the
right.”199 Applying the “converging Clause” approach, the majority
concluded that denying individuals the right to marry based on
their sexual orientation both irrationally prohibits their exercise of

the genders of the participants, so the restriction is a gender-based
classification” and ultimately concluding that the state statute and
constitutional amendment at issue did not survive “intermediate scrutiny”);
see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (stating that a
law criminalizing homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy does not
survive rational review under the Equal protection Clause).
197. See supra note 13.
198. The dissent represents the majority’s substantive due process analysis
as entirely unrestrained and subjective. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630
(stating that the Court’s substantive due process analysis “stands for nothing
whatever, except those freedoms and entitlements that this Court really
likes”).
199. Id. at 2602 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 2618 (Robert, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s holding as simply “[e]xpanding a
right”). The exclusion question necessarily resolves the case because if the
class of persons at issue cannot be excluded from the fundamental right, it
would be inherently irrational and arbitrary for states to thereafter
categorically deny that class of persons the right.
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an important liberty interest200 and irrationally discriminates
against that class of persons. 201
In arriving at this conclusion, the majority implicitly applied
a form of heightened judicial scrutiny to address and reject the
States’ arguments offered in support of their exclusion. 202 The
majority relied on the “converging Clause” approach to justify this
application of heightened scrutiny. 203 This approach certainly has
jurisprudential support: Past case law demonstrates that the Due
Process Clause requires heightened scrutiny when the legislative
measure at issue denies individuals a fundamental right 204 and
the Equal Protection Clause requires heighted scrutiny when the
legislative classification at issue involves a fundamental right. 205
However, in each of these cases the Court operated under the
assumption that the individuals involved originally could exercise
but were thereafter denied the fundamental right due to particular
circumstances. 206 Obergefell is unique because the case does not
involve individuals that by definition could originally exercise but
where thereafter denied a fundamental right. Instead, the case

200. Id. at 2604 (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in
the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same -sex may not be
deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
201. See id. at 2607 (“The Constitution . . . does not permit the State to bar
same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of
the opposite sex.”).
202. The majority not only closely scrutinized the reasons on record for
preserving traditional marriage; it also did not attempt to consider any other
possible justifications. See id. at 2599-2605; accord SmithKline, 740 F.3d at
482 (finding that the Supreme Court did not apply rational review in U.S. v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) due to its “failure to con sider other
unsupported bases” which the court found “antithetical to the very concept of
rational basis review.”); contra DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir.
2014) rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (“So long as judges can
conceive of some ‘plausible’ reason for the law—any plausible reason, even one
that did not motivate the legislators who enacted it—the law must stand, no
matter how unfair, unjust, or unwise the judges may consider it as citizens.”).
203. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603-04.
204. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116-17 (1996) (stating that
“[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are
among associational rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic importance in
our society’” and “demand[] the close consideration [of] the Court”) (citations
omitted).
205. See Skinner v. Oklahmoa, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that
“strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law
is essential” because such classifications involve the fundamental right to
procreate).
206. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (invalidating a law
that prohibited fathers who were behind on child support from marrying); see
also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (invalidating burdensome
restrictions on marriage based on an individuals’ status as a prisoner); see also
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 (invalidating a statute requiring indigent mothers to
pay a fee in order to appeal the termination of their parental rights).
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involves individuals who arguably by definition cannot exercise
the fundamental right at issue. 207
Indeed, as the dissent puts it, the crucial question in the case
is not whether “the Constitution protects a right to marry and
requires States to apply their marriage laws equally” (which it
indisputably does); rather, the primary question is “what
constitutes ‘marriage?’”208 If “marriage” by definition does not
include same-sex couples, then their exclusion is arguably
constitutionally permissible. This kind of definitional exclusion is
analogous to the Boy Scouts of America excluding girls or Veterans
of Foreign Wars excluding persons who did not serve in the armed
forces. Just as “girls” inherently cannot be “Boy Scouts” and nonserving persons cannot by definition be “veterans,” the argument
goes that same-sex couples inherently cannot enter into a
“marriage” because the very definition of marriage requires a
union between one man and one woman.
The problem with the dissent’s approach is that every
traditional element of marriage is part of its “definition” until it is
not. Indeed, the deeply-rooted, traditional definition of marriage
can be defined as a “prearranged, long-term union of two
individuals of the same race and opposite sex where the woman
has no legal status independent of her husband.” This definition,
needless to say, inherently excludes interracial marriage (among
other types of marriages). While the dissent characterizes Loving
as a case that did not redefine marriage but instead simply struck
down “racial restrictions” on marriage, 209 such a characterization
essentially assumes what it sets out to prove—that the same-race
requirement was not a fundamental element of marriage. But that
is historically inaccurate. Until Loving, in many states the samerace requirement was just as deeply rooted of a tradition as the
opposite-sex requirement. 210 Just as the dissent in Obergefell
frames the plaintiffs as arguing for a right to “same-sex marriage,”
the individuals in Loving argued for a right to “mixed-race
marriage”211—a right with no history or tradition in the United
207. The majority’s opinion arguably assumes what it set outs to prove:
that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right. If marriage by definition does
and cannot include same-sex couples, then same-sex marriage does not
actually involve a fundamental right.
208. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, J. dissenting).
209. Id. at 2614.
210. See Cyrus E. Phillips IV, Miscegenation: The Courts and the
Constitution, 8 WM . & MARY L. REV . 133, 133 (1966) (stating that
“[p]rohibitions against miscegenation date back to the earliest colonial times”
and “have appeared in the statutes of some forty states”); see also Brief for
Respondents at 52, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) (“The
Virginia statutes here under attack reflects [sic] a policy which has obtained in
this Commonwealth for over two centuries . . . .”).
211. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1202 (D. Utah
2013) aff'd, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Instead of declaring a new right
to interracial marriage, the [Loving] Court held that individuals could not be
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States. 212 Simply put, the same-race requirement was part of the
core definition of marriage until it was not.
Perhaps the “opposite sex” requirement is more fundamental
to the deeply-rooted, traditional definition of marriage than the
same-race requirement, 213 but that is largely immaterial. Just as
the “same race” requirement was arguably more fundamental than
the “pre-arranged” requirement (yet both are no longer definitional
requirements of the fundamental right), the “opposite sex”
requirement may very well be more fundamental to the deeplyrooted, traditional definition of marriage than the “same race”
requirement (yet both are no longer definitional requirements of
the fundamental right). Certainly, some immutable core definition
of marriage must exist or marriage would be malleable to the point
of meaninglessness. 214 However, because “the right to personal
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy,”215 the Court must closely scrutinize any definitional
exclusion from the enjoyment of this uniquely important and
fundamental right. 216
restricted from exercising their existing right to marry on account of the race
of their chosen partner. Similarly, the Plaintiffs here do not seek a new right
to same-sex marriage, but instead ask the court to hold that the State cannot
prohibit them from exercising their existing right to marry on account of the
sex of their chosen partner.”) (citations omitted).
212. See State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 405 (1871) (upholding interracial
marriage ban based on “the law of races established by the Creator himself”);
see Ronald Turner, Same-Sex Marriage and Loving v. Virginia: Analogy or
Disanalogy?, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV . O NLINE 264, 279 (2014) (stating that, as
a result of Loving, “[t]he traditional definition of marriage as the union of
persons of the same race was no longer valid”).
213. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (stating the
“core structure of marriage” as the union between a man and a woman”).
214. Without some core definition of marriage, the right would be illusory.
That core definition is best expressed as “a special and solemn bond between
two individuals entailing certain legal privileges and immunities.” Perhaps
the “two individuals” requirement could eventually give way to “a limited
number of individuals” requirement. Or perhaps such a requirement
constitutes the immutable core of the definition of marriage. The answer to
that question is beyond the scope of this Article as it was beyond the scope of
the Court’s inquiry in Obergefell. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. at 869
(“Liberty must not be extinguished for want of a line that is clear.”).
215. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
216. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“Although Loving
arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of
this Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all
individuals.”) (emphasis added). The special legal privileges and protections
accompanying marriage are legion. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601
(recognizing that “marriage [provides] the basis for an expanding list of
governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities” including “taxation;
inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege
in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority;
adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death
certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’
compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and

2016]

Implicit In The Concept Of Ordered Liberty

1067

Accordingly, the Obergefell Court closely scrutinized217 and
ultimately rejected the states’ arguments tendered in support of
their exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of
marriage. Specifically, the majority found that same-sex marriage,
with the equal force of opposite marriage, “is inherent in the
concept of individual autonomy,”218 “supports a two-person union
unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals,”219 “safeguards children and families,”220 and is the
“keystone of the Nation’s social order.” 221 The majority, therefore,
ultimately concluded that the states’ reasons for the exclusion
were either demonstrably invalid222 or equally applied to those
individuals granted the privilege. 223
Although the Court’s analysis is arguably limited to the
context of “definitional” substantive due process claims, it
nevertheless provides useful guidance to lower courts for
addressing
non-tradition-based
substantive
due
process

visitation rules”).
217. By following the framework set forth in Loving, Romer, and Windsor,
the majority essentially applied a form of heightened scrutiny to determine
whether or not effectively shutting out certain classes of persons from the very
definition of a fundamental right is constitutionally permissible . See id. at
2602 (“Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion
based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither
they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal
opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence
is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans
or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution,
same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite -sex
couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to
deny them this right.”); see also id. at 2604 (“[T]he right to marry is a
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples
of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
218. Id. at 2599.
219. Id. at 2589.
220. Id. at 2600.
221. Id. at 2590.
222. See e.g., id. at 2601 (“In light of precedent protecting the right of a
married couple not to procreate, it cannot be said the Court or the States have
conditioned the right to marry on the capacity or commitment to procreate.”);
see also id. at 2600 (“Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts
with a central premise of the right to marry. Without the recognition, stability,
and predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing
their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant material
costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their
own to a more difficult and uncertain family life.”); id. at 2607 (“The
respondents have not shown a foundation for the conclusion that allowing
same-sex marriage will cause the harmful outcomes they describe.”).
223. See e.g., id. at 2601 (“There is no difference between same-and
opposite-sex couples with respect to th[e] principle [of marriage as a basis of
‘legal and social order’].”); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (“[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may
be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.”).
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challenges. Particularly, the Obergefell case shows how lower
courts should apply the special kind of heightened scrutiny 224 the
Court relies on in non-tradition-based substantive due process
rights cases: Closely examine the government’s stated rationales
by determining whether they are reasonably directly and
reasonably consistently related to a legitimate government
interest. In such cases (involving rights essential to an individual’s
autonomy), the stated reasons cannot be too tenuous 225 and the
facts supporting them cannot be merely “inconclusive.” 226
Additionally, the stated reasons must be closely consistent for
similarly situated persons. 227 Most importantly, this “reasonable

224. This scrutiny is certainly not rational basis scrutiny, but neither does
it rise to the level of intermediate scrutiny. Rather, the Court’s scrutiny is best
described as “rational scrutiny with a bite.” See Emma Freeman, Giving Casey
Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis Review in Undue Burden Analysis , 48
HARV . C.R.-C.L. L. REV . 279, 285 (2013) (“Whereas courts applying traditional
rational basis presume legislative legitimacy and require only a superficial
nexus between the state’s regulatory means and ends, courts employing
rational basis with bite scrutinize the actual nature of the state’s interest and
thoroughly assess its relationship to the challenged statute.”). I shall refer to
the Obergefell Court’s specific amalgamation of this “rational scrutiny with a
bite” as “reasonable scrutiny.”
225. See supra, note 200; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003) (concluding that, even if drawn to comply with Equal Pr otection
requirement, the anti-sodomy statute “furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.”). Id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating, in the Equal
Protection context, “[m]oral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to
harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis
review”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“The federal
statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect
to disparage and to injure those whom the State.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a
basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so
directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due
process of law.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (finding, in the Equal
Protection context, that “[t]he breadth of the amendment is so far removed
from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.”).
226. See e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 8 (“[T]he State argues, the scientific
evidence is substantially in doubt and, consequently, this Court should defer
to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy of discouraging
interracial marriages.”); Brief for Respondents at 41, Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) (“Text and authorities which constitute the factual
basis for the legislative finding . . . indicate only that there is a difference of
opinion as to the wisdom of the policy underlying the enactments.”).
227. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“Here the marriage laws enforced
by the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are denied all the
benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a
fundamental right.”); see also Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465, 2471
(1985) (invalidating a tax after refuting the government’s stated rationales
and demonstrating the tax treated similarity situated persons unequally for
reasons unrelated to the purpose of the tax); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,
61-62 (1982) (invaliding a discriminatory oil revenue program by closely
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scrutiny” is not strict to the point of fatality or overreach; 228 but
neither is it so deferential as to permit veiled animus 229 or sham
rationality. 230

B. The Dissenting Opinions
The dissenting opinions advance six basic criticisms of the
majority’s decision: (1) it usurps the democratic process; 231 (2) it
constitutes judicial legislation; 232 (3) it lacks judicial restraint; 233

examining and refuting the government’s stated rationales for discriminating
between similarly situated individuals).
228. To be clear, this form of scrutiny does not require a “compelling” or
even “important” government interest—just a valid and defensible “legitimate
interest.” Moreover, the law need not be “narrowly tailored” but simply
“substantially related” to that government interest. Notably, the Obergefell
majority’s level of scrutiny would have produced different results in both Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). First, in the Dred Scott case, the Court would have closely scrutinized
the categorical exclusion of African Americans from basic civil rights and
liberties. After determining that the question of citizenship for black persons
was at most inconclusive, the Court would have recognized that the exclusion
of African Americans from the definition of “citizen” was unjustified. In
Lochner, the Court would have recognized the legitimate state interest in
limiting working hours for bakers due to the physically taxing nature of the
job as well the unhealthy conditions of most bake shops. As these conditions
were particular for bakers, and as legislatures across the country were slowly
implementing step-by-step labor reform, the Court would not have found any
veiled animus or unequal treatment. In short, the legislative act in Lochner
would have easily survived “reasonable scrutiny.”
229. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (“The avowed purpose and practical
effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate
status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”); Romer, 517 U.S. at 634
(“[T]he inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected.”); Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (“The
fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons
demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own
justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”); see also
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (quoting Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 336 U. S. 112-113 (1949) (Jackson, J.
concurring) (“[N]othing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation, and thus to escape the political re tribution that might be visited
upon them if larger numbers were affected.”)).
230. See e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (“The respondents have not
shown a foundation for the conclusion that allowing same -sex marriage will
cause the harmful outcomes they describe.”); see also Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 90 (1987) (stating that “[a] factor relevant in determining the
reasonableness of a prison restriction . . . is whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.”).
231. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612, 2624-25 (2015) (Roberts, J.
dissenting); id. at 2626-31 (Scalia, J. dissenting); Id. at 2637-38 (Thomas, J.
dissenting); id. at 2642 (Alito, J. dissenting).
232. See id. at 2612 (Roberts, J. dissenting); id. at 2629 (Scalia, J.
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(4) it directly threatens good-faith, religious objectors; 234 (5) it
treats a government-granted privilege as a natural liberty
interest; 235 and, (6) it incorrectly dismisses the legitimate state
interest of preserving traditional marriage. 236 All six criticisms
have at least some merit; however, upon closer analysis, none of
them hold water.
The first criticism seemingly rebukes the concept of judicial
review in general. Specifically, the fact that “five unelected
Justices”237 can effectively “veto” democratically-passed laws is an
inherent and universally accepted part of modern judicial review.
Although some do criticize this power and question its
Constitutional foundation, the Court nonetheless exercises the
power on a regular basis and it is difficult to understand how any
Justice who regularly exercises this power can criticize it. 238 The
Court, moreover, exercises this power not just in cases involving
written and explicitly defined constitutional provisions, but also in
cases involving vague concepts such as “free exercise of
religion,”239 “interstate commerce,”240 “reasonableness,”241 as well
as in cases involving implied and undefined concepts, such as “war
powers,”242 “freedom of association,”243 and “fundamental
fairness,”244 and yes, “substantive due process.”245 Indeed, judicial
nullification based on implied and undefined concepts is a staple of
the modern judiciary.

dissenting); id. at 2643 (Alito, J. dissenting).
233. See id. at 2621, 2624, 2626 (Roberts, J. dissenting); id. at 2631
(Thomas, J. dissenting); id. at 2639, 2643 (Alito, J. dissenting).
234. See id. at 2625-26 (Roberts, J. dissenting); id. at 2638-39 (Thomas, J.
dissenting).
235. See id. at 2620 (Roberts, J. dissenting); id. at 2629-2637 (Thomas, J.
dissenting).
236. See id. at 2623 (Roberts, J. dissenting); id. at 2641 (Alito, J.
dissenting).
237. Id. at 2640 (Alito, J. dissenting); see also id. at 2612 (Roberts, J.
dissenting) (stating that “[f]ive lawyers have closed the debate” and the Court
“[s]t[ole] this issue from the people”).
238. The argument that the majority’s specific application of substantive
due process usurps the democratic process is better addressed through the
dissenters’ criticisms arguing the majority lacked judicial restraint, see note
232, and failed to properly account for traditional marriage as a legitimate
state interest. See supra note 236.
239. See e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531 (1993).
240. See e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2573
(2012).
241. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013). Often times, what is
“reasonable” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence simply comes down to what
“th[e] Court really likes.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
242. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004).
243. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
244. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
245. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010).
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Second, 246 the dissenters denounce the Obergefell majority’s
alleged exercise of “judicial legislation.”247 Specifically, the
dissenters charge the majority with engaging in “judicial policy
making,”248 “practice[ing] . . . constitutional revision,”249
“resolv[ing] . . . the policy question of same-sex marriage,”250 and
“invent[ing] a new right and impos[ing] that right on the rest of
the country.”251 As explained above, however, it is well-established
that the Due Process Clause prohibits legislative judgments, that
legislative acts premised on bogus causes of forfeiture constitute
legislative judgments, that “all substantial arbitrary impositions
and purposeless restraints”252 constitute bogus causes of forfeiture,
and that it is therefore the role and duty of the courts to strike
down all legislative acts premised on “arbitrary impositions” or
“purposeless restraints.”253 Determining whether or not a
legislative act is arbitrary or irrational does not constitute judicial
legislation; 254 instead, it is the heart of the modern substantive
due process judicial analysis. Moreover, determining whether a
class of individuals denied privileges or liberties granted to
similarly situated individuals does not constitute judicial
legislation either; it is the heart of the modern Equal Protection
Clause judicial analysis. 255
Third, the dissenting Justices assert that the majority’s
decision lacks judicial restraint. Specifically, they argue that “[t]he
majority . . . neglects [a] restrained conception of the judicial
role,”256 that the Justices “roam at large in the constitutional field
guided only by their personal views,”257 and that “[t]he Justices in
the majority claim the authority to confer constitutional protection
upon that right simply because they believe that it is
fundamental.”258
However, as explained above, this is not an
accurate representation of the majority’s analysis. 259 Far from

246. The criticism claiming the majority crafted judicial legislation is
arguably just an extension of the criticism that the majority usurped the
democratic process. .
247. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, J. dissenting) (“The
majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judgment.”); see also id. at 2629
(Scalia, J. dissenting).
248. Id. at 2623 (Roberts, J. dissenting).
249. Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
250. Id. at 2629 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
251. Id. at 2643 (Alito, J. dissenting).
252. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
253. See supra notes 154-62.
254. See supra notes 131-162. Whether the Court exercised the proper level
of judicial scrutiny when examining the same -sex marriage ban is an
altogether different question. See supra notes 232-237.
255. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
256. Id. at 2612 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
258. Id. at 2640-41 (Alito, J., dissenting).
259. See supra notes 198-223.
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“roaming at large in the constitutional field,” the majority’s
opinion is actually quite focused: it simply answers the narrow
question of whether the class of persons at issue can be
legitimately excluded from the definition of the deeply-rooted,
fundamental right of marriage. 260 The majority, moreover, does
not apply the dangerous “strict scrutiny” used in other
“fundamental rights” cases or the “intermediate scrutiny” used in
cases involving classifications based on gender; instead, the
majority applies a slightly heightened level of scrutiny
(“reasonably scrutiny”) that is generally deferential but does not
permit veiled animus or indefensible rationality. 261 Far from
lacking judicial restraint, the majority’s decision—stripped of its
sweeping rhetorical gloss—is built around a markedly restrained
analysis.
Fourth, the dissent admonishes the majority for creating a
right that directly imperils others’ ability to adhere to their deeply
held religious beliefs. 262 Specifically, the dissenting Justices argue
that the majority’s ruling does not allow for “accommodations for
religious practice.”263 However, as Justice Thomas points out,
“[r]eligious liberty is about freedom of action in matters of religion
generally, and the scope of that liberty is directly correlated to the
civil restraints placed upon religious practice. ”264 The civil
restraints placed upon religious practices that pertain to samemarriage (like the civil restraints pertaining to discrimination
against race and gender) are necessary to protect others’
realization and expression of their fundamental rights, as well as
to prevent discrimination against a class of persons. 265 Attaining a
260. See supra notes 199.
261. See supra notes 228-29.
262. See id. at 2625; see also id. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
majority's decision threatens the religious liberty our Nation has long sought
to protect.”).
263. See id. at 2625 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
265. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often
Conflates Status, Belief, and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms , 45
G A. L. REV . 657, 660 (2011) (recognizing similarities between religious-based
objections to race and religious-based objections sexual orientation); Martha
Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C.
L. REV . 781, 810 (2007) (identifying similarities between religious-based
objections to gender and religious-based objections sexual orientation); see also
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“Especially against a long history of disapproval
of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry
works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays
and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”); see also Davis v.
Beason, 10 S. Ct. 299, 344-45 (1890) (“[W]hile [laws] cannot interfere with
mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices. . . . Crime is not
the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate
as ‘religion.’”). But see In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1037 (Miss. 1985)
(“Religiously grounded actions or conduct are often beyond the authority of the
state to control. Where the religiously grounded ‘action’ is a refusal to act
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marriage license requires access to government services and such
services cannot be denied to individuals due to another’s religious
beliefs. 266 Moreover, on a wide enough scale, discriminatory
“religious practices” effectively shut out a class of persons from
civil society. 267 Whatever difficulties individuals, lawmakers, or
courts face in negotiating between religious liberty and the
fundamental rights of same-sex couples, they face the same
difficulties in negotiating between religious freedom with other
state interests. 268
Fifth, the dissenting Justices criticize the majority for
treating a government-granted privilege as a natural liberty
interest. Specifically, the dissent argues that “liberty has long
been understood as individual freedom from governmental action,
not as a right to a particular governmental entitlement.” 269 To
some extent, the dissent has a point . While government
restrictions on an individual’s ability to date, cohabitate, engage in
intimate relations and raise a family with another person of the
same sex certainly infringes on that individual’s “ordered liberty,”
many of the “benefits” accompanying marriage are indeed
“government entitlements.” Nevertheless, some of the “benefits,”
such as the liberty to visit a spouse in a hospital intensive care
unit during restricted visiting hours, and the freedom to live in
family-zoned area, do involve protections of natural liberty.
Moreover, “government entitlements” are protected under the
same substantive due process regime as liberty interests. 270 Lastly,
as the majority explicitly states, the Equal Protection Clause alone

rather than affirmative, overt conduct, the State’s authority to interfere is
virtually non-existent except only in the instance of the grave and immediate
public danger”).
266. A city official cannot deny gay couples a marriage license any more
than a racist pollster can refuse to register an African American voter simply
because the pollster’s deeply-held religious belief precludes a “mixing of the
races.” Likewise, a “traditionalist” cannot deny a woman a job because it is his
deeply-held religious belief that God made woman for man and woman must
be in the home, not the work place. Discriminatio n is injurious and unlawful
and religious-motivated discrimination is no less injurious or unlawful.
267. Discrimination-based exclusion by individuals and businesses on a
large scale restricts and can practically deny important goods and services (as
well as social equality and dignity) to law-abiding citizens.
268. Indeed, the same problems existed following the Loving decision. See
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (holding that the
governmental interest in eradicating discriminating in education “outweighs
whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners’ exercise of the ir
religious beliefs”).
269. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2634 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
270. Such government entitlements are considered a “property right” in
due process jurisprudence. See e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970)
(holding that welfare benefits are “a matter of statutory entitlement for
persons qualified to receive them” and, therefore, the Due Process Clause
precludes their arbitrary or irrational deprivation or denial).
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provides perhaps the most compelling ground for the Court’s
opinion. 271
Finally, the dissenters’ sixth criticism, that the state bans are
rationally related to a legitimate government interest, does not
hold up to scrutiny. The dissenting Justices offer two “legitimate
government interests” in support of the states’ same-sex bans: (1)
“preserving traditional marriage”272 and (2) “encourag[ing]
potentially procreative conduct to take place within a lasting unit
that has long been thought to provide the best atmosphere for
raising children.”273 These justifications, however, do not survive
the Court’s “reasonable scrutiny.” First, “tradition” in and of itself
is not a legitimate government interest. 274
If it were, every
irrational old law could be justified for the sake of being old. 275
The dissenting Justices’ second argument, furthermore, is equally
as indefensible. In an earlier time, perhaps the dissent could have
reasonably argued that marriage served the purpose of confining
procreative conduct to a lasting union that enabled stable child
rearing. But that is no longer the case; heterosexual couples over
the last century have re-defined marriage to permit infidelity, nofault divorce, women’s rights, adoption, and the union of barren
and sterilized couples. 276 The dissent’s procreation-child rearing
argument, therefore, is no longer rationally related to the modern
271. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2591 (“[U]nder the . . . Equal Protection
Clause[] of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same -sex may not be
deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
272. See id. at 2623 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (stating that “distinguishing
between opposite-sex and same-sex couples is rationally related to the States’
legitimate state interest in preserving the traditional institution of marriage”)
(citations omitted).
273. Id. at 2641 (Alito, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 2602 (“If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past,
then received practices could serve as their own continued justification . . .”);
see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003); Baskin v. Bogan, 766
F.3d 648, 666 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J) (“The state’s argument from tradition runs
head on into Loving v. Virginia, since the limitation of marriage to persons of
the same race was traditional in a number of states when the Supreme Court
invalidated it.”) (citation omitted); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition As
Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. CHI . L. REV . 281, 322
(2011) (“When tradition is offered as a primary justification for a legislative
classification, the risk that the classification is motivated by illegitimate
purposes is too great to accept without a closer examination of the actual
purposes underlying the classification.”).
275. The “appeal to tradition” fallacy is one of better known logical
fallacies.
276. See Amber Bailey, Redefining Marriage: How the Institution of
Marriage Has Changed to Make Room for Same-Sex Couples, 27 WIS . J.L.
G ENDER & SOC’Y 305, 307 (2012); see also Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1201 (D. Utah 2013) (“[H]owever persuasive the ability to procreate
might be in the context of a particular religious perspective, it is not a defining
characteristic of conjugal relationships from a legal and constitutional point of
view.”). In addition, the law permits (indeed, the Constitution protects) non married individuals to engage in sexual activity.
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institution of marriage. 277 And it would be irrational and arbitrary
to grant heterosexual couples who lack procreative abilities the
right to marry, yet deny same-sex marriage this important
privilege. 278 This is especially true given the fact that, as the
majority points out, same-sex marriage equally promotes the
remaining state interests furthered by the “privilege” of
marriage. 279
The dissenting Justices, therefore, do not refute the majority’s
opinion. Instead, they merely reaffirm the validity of the majority’s
explicit and implicit constitutional analysis. The definition of
marriage must include same-sex couples because their exclusion
irrationally restricts those persons’ liberty and irrationally
discriminates against that class of persons.

V. CONCLUSION
Obergefell v. Hodges demonstrates that some rights are
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” (and therefore
“fundamental”) even though they are not “deeply rooted in our
Nation’s history and traditions.” More importantly, Obergefell
shows that the judicial identification and protection of such rights
is by no means open-ended and subjective; instead, as the
Obergefell case and its predecessors implicitly reveal, the judicial
identification of new rights is limited to traditionally recognized
categories of fundamental rights. The judicial protection of those
rights, moreover, is limited by the application of a scrutiny only
slightly higher level than “rational basis review”—“reasonable
scrutiny.” This narrow and well-confined substantive due process
analysis is a reasonable and workable addition to “tradition-based”
substantive due process model: It permits the recognition of new
rights but within a restrained framework.
While it is true that the modern Court’s expansion of
substantive due process to all “arbitrary impositions and
277. The legislative bans are “so riddled with exceptions that deterrence of
premarital sex cannot reasonably be regarded as its aim.” Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 449 (1972).
278. See Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1211-12 (quoting City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (“[A]ny relationship between
Amendment 3 and the State’s interest in responsible procreation ‘is so
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.’”)); see also
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 450 (“[I]f health were the rationale, the statute would
be. . . discriminatory and overbroad. . . .”); id. at 447 (“The Equal Protection
Clause . . . den[ies] to States the power to legislate that different treatment be
accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of
criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute classification.”);
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (“[T]he classification
must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”).
279. See supra notes 218-223.
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purposeless restraints” invites a dangerous degree of judicial
discretion, and that such an aggressive judicial assumption of
authority strongly counsels for a model of restraint and
objectivity, 280 the Obergefell Court’s approach—a crystallization of
the framework set forth in Casey, Romer, Lawrence, and
Windsor—provides a workable model that permits the recognition
and protection of new rights while preserving the judicial restraint
and analytical objectivity necessary to uphold the respect for—and
therefore authority of—this “dependent” branch of government.

280. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The Judiciary is the ‘least
dangerous’ of the federal branches because it has ‘neither Force nor Will, but
merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive
arm’ and the States, ‘even for the efficacy of its judgments.’”)).

